35
Making the Sustainable Development
Goals Work
Haciendo que los Objetivos de
Desarrollo Sostenible funcionen
Artículo de revisión
Received: August 26, 2016
Approved: December 10, 2016
* Gianni Vaggi: Phd en Economía por la Uni-
versidad de Cambridge. Director de la Coo-
peration and Development Network (CDN)
y profesor de los masters en cooperación y
desarrollo de la Universidad de pavia, Uni-
versidad de Belén, Mid-western University
of Nepal y la Universidad de Kenyatta, Nai-
rob. Coordinador of the UNESCO UNITWIN
Network on Cooperation and Development.
Contacto: gianni.vaggi@unipv.it
How to quote: Vaggi, G. (2016). Making the
Sustainable Development Goals Work. Inter-
national Journal of Cooperation & Develop-
ment. 3(2): 35-59
Gianni Vaggi
*
Gianni Vaggi
36
Revista Internacional de Cooperación y Desarrollo Vol. 3 No. 2 | Año 2016 | PP. 35-59
Abstract
The achievement of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals approved by the UN General Assem-
bly in 2015 will depend on whether or not the last goal, “global partnership for sustainable deve-
lopment, will work. The paper suggests that the leading principle for eective global partnership
should be the rebalancing of the negotiating power of the dierent stakeholders. Section I briey
sketches some changes to the notion of development and of cooperation since 1950. Section
II describes the process which has led to the SDGs and to the idea of cooperation as a global
partnership. Section III focuses on two major economic changes which have taken place since the
seventies: economic growth in Asia and the rise of international nance. Both of which have huge
implications for the SDGs and for global partnership. Section IV presents three steps which could
help to implement “global partnership for development” according to the principle of rebalancing.
Developing countries need more policy space especially in their trade and scal policies.
Keywords: Development, goals, cooperation, crisis
Resumen
El logro de los 17 Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible aprobados por la Asamblea General de las
Naciones Unidas en 2015 dependerá en gran medida del funcionamiento del último objetivo:Aso-
ciación global para el desarrollo sostenible”. El documento sugiere que el punto principal para una
asociación global efectiva debería ser el reequilibrio del poder de negociación de las diferentes
partes interesadas. De esta manera, en la sección I se describen brevemente algunos cambios
en la noción de desarrollo y cooperación desde 1950. En la Sección II se describe el proceso que
ha conducido a los ODS y a la idea de cooperación como asociación mundial. La sección III se
centra en dos grandes cambios económicos que han tenido lugar desde la década de los setenta:
el crecimiento económico en Asia y el auge de las nanzas internacionales. Ambos hechos tienen
enormes implicaciones para los ODS y para la asociación global. La sección IV presenta tres pa-
sos que podrían ayudar a implementar la “asociación global para el desarrollo” de acuerdo con el
principio de reequilibrio. Los países en desarrollo necesitan más espacio político, especialmente
en sus políticas comerciales y scales.
Palabras clave: Desarrollo, Objetivo de Desarrollo Sostenible (ODS), cooperación, crisis.
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1. Introduction
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section
II describe in an extremely synthetic way the
main evolution in the notions of development
and of cooperation since the sixties up to the
new Sustainable Development Goals, SDGs.
Of course this is not a comprehensive review
of the two issues, for that one can read the very
helpful work of Tassara 2012. The paper shows
that the notion of development has received a
much broader content than it was in the sixties,
when it was by and large dened in terms of
economic growth. Development is now a mul-
ti-faced phenomenon and it is also focused
on people’s empowerment, there has been a
clear movement towards the individual, micro,
aspects, while the more structural and macro
feature are now less central.
Section III presents a brief view of the evolu-
tion from the Millennium Development Goals,
MDGs, to the SDGs and in focuses on the last
MDG and SDGs, both on global partnership,
which seems to be the new view of cooperation.
But how can this view be implemented? De-
velopment and cooperation do not take place
in the vacuum and must not be confused with
the numerous discussions, proposals, debates
which are being putting forward every day. De-
velopment and cooperation/partnership must
take into account the social, economic and
political structures existing in our world and
we must realistically examine the opportunities
and the constraints of this global ‘environment’.
Therefore section IV brings us down to the real
world and describes two major changes in the
this global economic environment: economic
growth in Asia and the growing role of interna-
tional nance. These two facts greatly inuence
the environment in which the SDGs must be
pursued through global partnership.
Section V faces SDG 17 and provides some
suggestions on how to support to make global
partnership work in the new economic lands-
cape, briey described in Section IV. Here we
nd the general principle which should lead all
the negotiations which are inevitably necessary
in order to engage with the SDGs. The paper
suggests the general principle of re-balancing
of the negotiating powers as the leading way
to try to make global partnership not only fair
but also eective. Re-balancing is a way to put
into action the two principles of universality and
dierentiation which are in the UN declaration
of September 2015. This section provides also
some examples of what re-balancing should be
and it examines some of the topics which are
part of SDG 17 such as trade, scal and indus-
trial policies.
2. The evolution of the notions of
development and of international
cooperation (in a nutshell)
A. In the beginning it was economic
growth
On September 25-27, 2016 the seventieth ses-
sion of the United Nations General Assembly
approved a resolution called Transforming our
world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Develo-
pment with 17 Sustainable Development Goals,
SDGs, and 169 targets, now we have also 241
indicators(see UN, 2015 and UN-ECOSOC,
2016). This resolution, also called Agenda
2030, presents a very wide view of develop-
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Making the Sustainable Development Goals Work
ment and in many ways the SDGs can be re-
garded as sort of contemporary consensus on
what development is all about. Sixty years ago
there were dierent views.
Once upon a time there was economic growth:
development was mainly dened in terms of in-
creases in income per capita and it was by and
large regarded as a one dimensional notion. In
development economics there was, and still is,
a theory explaining that low income countries
will converge to the income per capita of the
high income ones. The accumulation of physi-
cal capital was regarded as the main element
in the explanation of economic growth and So-
low’s 1956 model implies that capital will ow to
low income economies where it is scarce and
hence it can yield higher returns. Technical pro-
gress too will also move freely across countries
and provided that the markets are competitive
and given enough time all countries will tend to
have similar incomes per capita.
If this views were correct there would be no need
for developmental theories and policies, nor
for cooperation activities. Cooperation should
conne itself to the mitigation of the short run
unpleasant occurrences which might be asso-
ciated the long run process of economic grow-
th. Cooperation should provide safety nets and
care for basic needs and human development.
Since the late forties there have been econo-
mic views which are quite skeptical about the
eciency of the market economy and its abi-
lity to bring wellbeing to all countries. These
non-mainstream contributions date back to the
structural change approach of Raul Prebisch
and Hans Singer. In the late sixties and in the
seventies Dudley Seers and the International
Labour Oce, ILO, highlight the importance
of employment and of decent work(see Seers,
1969 and ILO, 1976). Sunna and Gualerzi pro-
vide a very useful reading to these heterodox
economic views on development, which howe-
ver they too focused on the economic compo-
nent of development (see Sunna and Gualerzi
2016, chapters 3 and 5).
Coming back to the more optimistic views about
the economic perspectives of developing coun-
tries it is easy to see that apart from East Asia
the eighties and nineties have not seen much
convergence of most low income countries
towards the living standards of high income
economies. Moreover theoretical studies and
practical experience have shown that economic
growth alone does not guarantee participatory
and sustainable development. There are rapidly
growing countries where social hardships are
multiplying and new forms of poverty are being
created. There are other countries where des-
pite slow growth considerable improvements
have been made in terms human development
and well-being.
Nowadays development is no longer dened in
terms of income per capita only; development is
regarded as a multi-faced phenomenon and as
evolving process. Let us briey point out some
of the major contributions to this new view. It all
started with the debates in the sixties and se-
venties, but it was only towards the end of the
eighties which a general consensus began to
emerge on a broader denition of development,
(more in Vaggi, 2010).
Three major contributions to this change can be
identied.
First, the 1987 Bruntland Report by the United
nations gives a rst denition of sustainable
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development: a process which can satisfy the
needs of present generations without compro-
mising the possibilities of future generations
(see United Nations, 1987). With this report the
environment dimension and the idea of sustai-
nability become essential aspects of the notion
of development.
Second, in 1990 we have the rst Human Deve-
lopment Report by UNDP with the Human Deve-
lopment Index, which includes not only income,
but also education and health(see UNDP, 1990).
Third, in September 2000 the United Nations
present the Millenium Development Goals,
MDGs, eight goals which provide a widely ac-
cepted denition of development, including the
ght against poverty, health, education, envi-
ronment and gender.
More recently the very notion of Gross Domes-
tic Product has been criticized as an appropria-
te indicator of the standard of living of people.
The research work focuses on the denition of
well-being, perhaps the most famous report is
the Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi Report of 2008
(see Stiglitz et al., 2008).
Environmental sustainability receives a lot of at-
tention, see for instance the work of Dasgupta
at Cambridge (see Dasgupta and Duraiappah,
2012). In 2012 we have also the rst World Ha-
ppiness Report by a team led by Jerey Sachs
(see Helliwell et al., 2013).
Poverty too is no longer dened in terms of in-
come only, but more in general as ‘deprivation’
and ‘exclusion’ or the lack of capabilities, in the
sense of lack of the possibility to decide and to
choose about one’s life. Since 2010 we have
the Multidimensional Poverty Index by OPHI,
the Oxford Poverty and Human Development
Initiative (see Alkire et al., 2013).
All these approaches to development share
some major similarities; we single out two of
them. First, development corresponds to the
enlargement of opportunities and possibilities of
choice by the people. Second, development it is
a process which is appreciated in a positive way
by the people who are involved in it. The evolu-
tion of the notion of development and the emer-
gence of that of ‘human development’ have been
greatly inuenced by the work of Nobel Laureate
Amartya Sen (see Sen, 1985 and 1999).
The idea of the Sustainable Development Goals
emerged in 2011 during the preparatory works
for the 2012 Rio+20 conference thanks to a pro-
posal by Colombia and Guatemala(see Loewe
and Rippin, 2015, pp. 2, 4). The COP 21 Paris
meeting of December 2016 has been the nal
event linking development to climate change
and environmental sustainability. However the
notion of sustainability has already received a
broad denition, which is not limited to the envi-
ronmental aspect(see for instance Sachs 1999).
B. International cooperation
Dierent views of development have been ac-
companied by dierent ideas about how to
achieve it.
The eighties and nineties have been the period
of the Washington Consensus, a term coined
by John Williamson to indicate ten major points
which characterized the IMF-World Bank re-
commendations to developing countries(see
Williamson, 1990). These policies have been
the key elements of the Structural Adjustment
Programs of the IMF and the World Bank. The-
se standardized policies were considered to be
necessary and sucient to trigger economic
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Making the Sustainable Development Goals Work
growth in very dierent countries; it was a ‘one
recipe ts all’ approach. It is worth noticing that
these policies were also the result of a rather
optimistic view and limited view about the fact
that market forces alone could generate econo-
mic growth and development.
The structural adjustment policies received
strong criticisms. The idea of a post-Washing-
ton Consensus derives from a paper by Joseph
Stiglitz in 1998 (see Stiglitz, 1998), when he
was Senior Vice-president of the World Bank. In
the paper Stiglitz advocates the need for more
articulated and less economic focused policies,
he also highlights the fact that development has
to be interpreted in terms of broader goals, not
just income.
In January 1999 the then President of the World
Bank James Wolfenshon launched the Com-
prehensive Development Framework, CDF(see
Wolfenshon, 1999 and http://web.worldbank.
org/archive/website01013/WEB/0__CON-3.
HTM). This very ambitious, but by now rather
forgotten, approach proposes a new methodo-
logy to approach development and the related
policies. Development is dened in terms of
many aspects and the analysis includes many
dierent actors: the nation states, international
organizations, civil society, the business sector.
In a two dimensional table there is an attempt
to identify the actors who could be more eec-
tive in pursuing each development aspect. In a
way this approach anticipates SDG number 17,
which deals with “...global partnership for sus-
tainable development”.
Below there is a very fats description of some
major intentional forums which have shaped a
widespread view on cooperation and partner-
ship: I am not interested in the precise descrip-
tion of the dierent contributions, but just to
show how the idea of cooperation has evolved
towards the notion of global partnership.
In march 2002 in Monterrey Mexico a confe-
rence was held on Financing for Development,
from which the so called Monterrey consensus
emerged. Developing countries should imple-
ment the appropriate policies and reforms, abo-
ve all good governance, but the rich countries
should concretely help mainly by committing
more and more predictable and stable resour-
ces, aid.
1
In 2016 only ve of countries reach
the 0.7 percent of GDP earmarked for aid, which
has been the UN target since the seventies(see
OECD, 2015). From November 29 to December
2, 2008 a second conference on Financing for
Development was held in Doha. A Third confe-
rence of Financing for Development was held
by the UN in Addis Ababa on July 2015 in pre-
paration for the September General Assembly(-
see UN-AAAA, 2015).
Since 2003 ve High Level Forums have been
held in order to dene the best practices in in-
ternational cooperation. The major topic of all
these conferences has been aid eectiveness,
which has however been examined from die-
rent points of view. The 2005 Paris declaration
recommends the donor to have more accoun-
table programs, to adopt coherent aid policies
and to coordinate among themselves. In 2008
the third high level forum produced the Accra
Agenda for Action in which the notion of coun-
try ownership is underlined.
In 2011 Busan the fourth High Level Forum on
Aid Eectiveness ended up with the Busan
Partnership for Eective Development Co-ope-
1
In Monterrey emphasis was also laid on the theme
of global public goods which include knowledge and re-
search(see also Sumner and Lawo, 2013, p.35).
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ration, which focuses on development eec-
tiveness and not just aid eectiveness. This
approach requires having shared evaluation
tools between all partners, including partners
in the ‘South’. The involvement of civil society
is another important issue and more attention
is dedicated to the development outcomes of
policies rather than to input indicators only.
In April 2014 in Mexico City there was the First
High-Level meeting of the Global Partnership
for Eective Development Co-operation, which
was in fact a follow up of all the previous High
Level Forums and where the emphasis was on
the partnership aspect of international coope-
ration(see UN-FHLM, 2014). All these forums
prepared the way to SDG 17, the one dealing
with global partnership.
The outcome of these debates about develo-
pment and cooperation can be described with
two words: empowerment and ownership.
Empowerment is the process of enhancing the
capacity of individuals or groups to make choi-
ces and to transform those choices into desired
actions and outcomes (Alsop et al., 2006, p.10)
Thus empowerment is the possibility to enlarge
one’s opportunities and her set of choices.
Ownership is the ability of developing countries
and of people to take the development pro-
cess into their own hands. Country ownership
appears both in the Paris Declaration and in the
Accra Agenda for Action(see above).
2
² Country ownership has also been used to indicate
the alignment of the countries to the conditionalities of the
Structural Adjustment Programs and Poverty Reduction
Strategy Papers of the nineties, see Buiter, 2007. For the
point of view of civil society organizations on country own-
ership see Interaction, 2011.
Country ownership means that there is sucient
political support within a country to implement its
developmental strategy, including the projects,
programs, and policies for which external part-
ners provide assistance. (see http://web.world-
bank.org/archive/website01013/WEB/0__CON-
5.HTM)
The country has to be in the driving seat, but of
course is not just a problem of the central govern-
ment’s ability to take decisions, it requires the in-
volvement of all stakeholders: local governments,
Civil Society Organizations, communities etc.
3. From the Millenium Development
Goals to the Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals
The MDGs played a very important role in hi-
ghlighting the major development challenges
confronting developing countries and the entire
world. Extreme poverty, was at the forefront with
the one dollar a day story which derives mainly
from Martin Ravaillon’s work rst exemplied
in the 1990 World Development Report (see
World Bank, 1990, pp.27-9). The one dollar a
day threshold has now become 1.90 at 2011
PPP, Purchasing Power Parities, prices.
It might look strange that at the time in which
the denitions of development and of poverty
are being enlarged and enriched MDG 1 refers
to income poverty. However we must remember
that from 1980 to 2000 three main regions in the
world, Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle
East and North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa
had no increase at all in income per capita, with
many countries experiencing a signicant decli-
ne. It was the lost decades period, mainly due to
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Making the Sustainable Development Goals Work
the debt crisis which erupted in Mexico in 1982.
It was obvious to regard the ght against inco-
me poverty as a priority; as a matter of fact the
World Bank dedicated to poverty two World De-
velopment Reports, that of 1990 and again that
of 2000/2001(see World Bank, 1990 and World
Bank, 2000/2001).
Since the 2012 Rio+20 conference there have
been a lot of debates on the post 2015 goals,
let me recall three preparatory UN documents.
The rst document is the May 2013 report by
the United Nations, The report of the High-Le-
vel Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015
Development Agenda, which includes 12 goals
and 54 targets(see UN-HLP, 2013). This report
stresses the fact that all goals should be exa-
mined having in mind ve transformative shifts:
leave no one behind, sustainability, jobs and in-
clusive growth, peace and institutions and glo-
bal partnership(see ibid.). The ve ‘transforma-
tive shifts’ provide an indication of the priorities
and above all of the relevant dimensions which
should shape future policies and actions; the
shifts appear in the September 2015 UN Reso-
lution but not with the same emphasis.
Leave no one behind implies that attention
should focus on the most disadvantaged and
marginalized groups and people, with very
important implication for policies in any type
of goal: health, education, environment, food,
energy, water, megacities etc . This ‘shift’ does
not appear as a separate goal in the nal UNGA
resolution of 2015, but it is quite often mentio-
ned all along that declaration.
Jobs and inclusive growth asks for a reconside-
ration of the production and consumption mo-
del and recognize that people do achieve more
opportunities and become more independent
mainly through access to decent growth. Mo-
reover this shift is a warning about the fact that
not any type of growth may be inclusive. SDG
number 8 includes some of these recommen-
dations.
Sustainability, is clearly a cross-cutting issue
for all goals.
Of course there must be eective and open ins-
titutions, but in the post 2015 period peace will
be a challenge in itself and cannot be limited
to good governance, transparency, etc. Building
peace provides a broader vision of institutions.
A second document is the report of the Open
Working Group for Sustainable Development
Goals presented in July 2014. The Open Wor-
king Group was established following the
Rio+20 Conference; which is basically the text
which will end up into the September 2015 Re-
solution(see UN-OWG, 2014).
The third document is the Synthesis Report
presented by the UN Secretary-General on De-
cember 4
th
2014 and entitled The road to dig-
nity by 2030. The report suggests to maintain
the 17 goals but they are now clustered into six
essential elements: dignity, people, prosperity,
planet, justice, partnership(see UN-SR, 2014,
p.16-19).
The three documents represent the most im-
portant contributions to the nal Resolution of
September 2015, which re-groups the goals
into ve areas of critical importance: People,
Planet, Prosperity, Peace, Partnership, the ve
Ps. Moreover the 2015 Resolution establishes
that sustainability has three dimensions: econo-
mic, social and environmental, all to be pursued
at the same time.
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Agenda 2030 is often criticized because there
are too many goals which do overlap and some
goals are extremely ambitious: zero poverty by
2030.
3
There is also a confusion between ends
and means, between those targets which could
be regarded as being a nal desired outcome,
like end hunger, gender equality, and those
goals which are indeed instrumental to achieve
the former ones, such as energy, infrastructures.
Notice that from the 2000 MDGs to the 2015 UN
Resolution the last goal always refers to partner-
ship. In the MDGs goal number 8 reads: Develop
a global partnership for development. There are
6 targets and 16 indicators which include issues
such as the increase of aid, the extension of mar-
ket access, debt sustainability. MDG 8 has been
quite often criticized because many targets and
indicators are very dicult to measure and in ge-
neral it provides a generic commitment to achie-
ve the other goals. The story of MDG 8 is howe-
ver rather interesting because originally there
was no goal number 8. As late as June 2000 in a
publication by OECD, World Bank, IMF and UN
called A better world for all the goals were still
seven(see OECD, 2000). MDG 8 was introdu-
ced later at the request of developing countries
which wanted the goals to be the responsibility
of all countries including the rich ones.
SDG 17 reads: Strengthen the means of imple-
mentation and revitalize the global partnership
for sustainable development, with 19 targets(-
see UN, 2015). SDG 17 seems to refer more to
the quantitative aspect, that is to say to nan-
cial support. The 2014 Synthesis Report was
more specic asking for “better regulation and
more stability in the international nancial and
³ Among the several comments see Maxwell, 2014
and Engel and Knoll, 2014. On the progress and improve-
ments of SDGs over MDGs see Fukuda-Parr, 2016.
monetary system”(see UN-SR, 2014, p.22, n.
95) and it even suggested the possibility of
nancial transaction taxes(ibid, p.25, n. 112).
Moreover the Synthesis Report requested the
implementation of “comprehensive and ade-
quate nancial regulations in all countries, as
the risk of another global nancial crisis has not
be suciently reduced”(ibid. p. 25, n. 114). The-
se recommendations did not nd their way into
the 2015 nal Resolution.
Goal 17 confronts itself with a major issue
which is the main topic of this paper: how to
give concrete content to the term ‘global part-
nership’. This implies raising the necessary re-
sources to support the SDGs which could be an
enormous amount of money(see Greenhill and
Prizzon, 2012). However partnership for deve-
lopment is not just about funds and above all
it does not take place in a vacuum, it must be
implemented in a specic economic and social
international environment. “Global partnership”
cannot ignore some major changes that have
taken place in the world economy since the ni-
neteen-eighties. We highlight two of them:
4
-economic growth in Asia
-the rising role of international nance.
Both facts have a structural nature; they are
here to stay and they have huge implications for
the new goals; it is only by taking into account
these facts that international cooperation activi-
ties and policies can be set in a realistic context.
We will briey see some positive and some ne-
gative aspects of both facts.
4
For a wider discussion of both changes see Vaggi,
2015. On Asian growth and the beautiful image of the
“ying geese” model see UNCTAD, 1996. For a history of
this model see Kasahara, 2013. Akyuz,2015 provides an
interesting analysis of nancial markets and developing
countries.
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Making the Sustainable Development Goals Work
4. The economy strikes back: from
G7 to G……?
A. The bright side of economic growth
Let us mention three features on the positive
side.
First, at the world level MDG 1, halving the
number of those living in extreme poverty,
less than 1.90 dollar a day at 2011 Purchasing
Power Parities, PPP, prices, has been achieved
thanks to economic growth in Asia and in China
in particular. According to the so called absolute
poverty line of 1.90 dollar a day in at 2011PPP
prices most of the poor people now live in mi-
ddle income countries(see Sumner, 2013, p.1,
Sumner and Lawo, 2013).
Second, the so called ‘South’ now has some
global powers, China, perhaps India, and some
regional powers, Brazil, South Africa and Rus-
sia, though since 2013 all three of them have
been going through an economic slowdown.
Emerging economies are not all the same, but
the old divisions into rich and poor countries, into
and north and south and the tri-partition into rst,
second and third world need to be replaced by a
more articulated geography. The world has mo-
ved from G7 to G20 and the capitalist economy
is still reshaping economic relations. Between
1995 and 2012 south-south trade has doubled
its share in world exports. Now there are more
players on the ground and with all diculties and
complications there are real possibilities for sou-
th-south cooperation and the SDGs strongly em-
phasize the universal aspect of the development
challenges rather than the north-south coopera-
tion, see Sanahuja, 2016. This does not mean
that any type of economic relationship between
developing countries should be automatically
classied as South-South cooperation. Accor-
ding to the Economic Commission for Latin Ame-
rica and the Caribbean, better known as CEPAL,
“the prevailing relationship between China and
Latin America and the Caribbean has been of a
North-South nature” (ECLAC 2016, p.14).
Third, since 1998 private ows to developing
countries have become more and more impor-
tant; Foreign Direct Investment and remittan-
ces are the largest nancial ows to developing
countries, with 600 and 450 billion of US dollars
respectively in 2014. Remittances include only
the ocially registered ones, hundreds of billions
are assumed to enter developing countries in an
unocial way. International aid is around 130
USD billion. Private benefactors and philanthro-
py ows have also increased enormously in the
rst fteen years of the new millennium.
5
B. However....on the dark side
Unfortunately some negative economic facts
characterize the international economic situa-
tion and could jeopardize the progress towards
the new SDGs.
First, since 2007-2088 a major nancial cri-
sis has hit the rich countries generating large
variability and major turbulences in nancial
markets. International nance is characterized
by systemic risk; the best description of this
situation is in the work of Hyman Minsky, who
foresaw the potential damages of uncontrolled
nance more than forty years ago. His ‘nancial
instability hypothesis’ dates back to the mid-se-
venties when the overall market for derivatives
was still puny(see Minsky, 1974).
5
More ows could come from some new development
banks such as the New Development Bank of the BRICS
and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, AIIB, both
initiatives were launched in 2014 with the backing of Chi-
na(see Grifth-Jones, 2014).
Gianni Vaggi
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Second, since the eighties income distribution
has worsened in all High Income economies
reversing a pattern of increasing equality which
had taken place from 1950 till 1980. According to
Piketty this largely depends on the fact that du-
ring the last thirty years returns on wealth have
been higher than the growth rates of the eco-
nomy, a fact which has led the concentration of
wealth into the hands of few people(see Piketty,
2013).
6
SDGs 10 asks for a reduction of inequali-
ties and this is a big improvement on the MDGs;
now equity is at the forefront in the debates about
development, but the changes in the economic
landscape which are discussed in this section
show how dicult and complicated it might be
to try to achieve this goal.
7
As we shall see in the
next section the reduction of inequalities has a
lot to do with the way in which global partnership
for development will be interpreted.
Third, since 2008 economic growth has been
quite weak in most High Income Economies
and there has been a slowdown also in emer-
ging economies. This has led to a debate on
the so called secular stagnation hypothesis, fo-
llowing Larry Summers’ reappraisal of this term.
Many explanations of this phenomenon focus
on the relationship between savings and invest-
ment and on the fact that due to an excess of
savings the real interest rate needed to equa-
te investments and savings at full employment
level may be negative.
8
This means that mone-
tary policy becomes ineective because due
to low ination and low nominal rates there is a
6
On the trends on global income inequality among
countries see also Milanovic, 2012.
7
Tassara, 2016 provides a very insightful analysis of
the challenges facing Latin American countries.
8
On the various explanations for secular stagna-
tion see Baldwin and Teulings, 2014. The origin of the
term ‘secular stagnation’ is discussed in Backhouse and
Boianovsky, 2016.
oor, the so called Zero Bound Level, ZBL, for
nominal rates (see Baldwin, and Teulings 2014,
p. 2.). To put it in Keynesian terms it is as if the
liquidity trap had become a permanent feature
of the economy(see Krugman’s paper in Bald-
win, and Teulings 2014, p.15). At the world level
there is an excess of savings over investments,
we could say that investments do not growth
enough notwithstanding cheap and abundant
savings. Major explanations for the increase in
savings are related to demographic changes(i-
bid., pp. 11-12, 14), and to an increase in life
expectancy combined with lower population
growth rate, the so called “ageing society”.
9
Other authors believe that technical progress is
losing its potentialities in terms of smaller pro-
ductivity increases than in the past(see the pa-
per by Gordon in Baldwin and Teulings, 2014).
In my view the savings glut plus demography
plus weak technical progress hypotheses are
not sucient elements to explain the slowdown
of growth rates in high income economies, it is
necessary to look for both supply and demand
side causes. There is a need for large invest-
ments in particular in infrastructures in both
high income economies(see Caballero R.J. and
Farhi E., 2014, pp. 118-119) and in developing
countries where population is still growing(see
Wol G.B., 2014, p. 146).
The present crisis has many features of a cri-
sis of overproduction with a lack of eective
demand which derives also from the worse-
ning income distribution (see Palley, 2016). For
many years China has been investing 35-40 per
cent of GDP, reaching 45 per cent in 2010, whi-
le other countries in Asia have followed similar
path, even if not with such exceptionally high in-
9
These phenomena increase the dependency ratio
because of the raising share of pensioners.
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Making the Sustainable Development Goals Work
vestment ratios. This has contributed to a situa-
tion of overcapacity at the world level; the ove-
rall productive capacity installed could produce
more goods than those which can protably be
sold on international markets. Some sectors
appear to be saturated, the car industry being
a case in point, but this is also the case for iron,
for the containers see-transport business and
for many consumer durables and also for some
high-tech products.
Fourth, the above situation generates huge im-
balances which manifest themselves both in
the dierent growth rates among countries and
above all in the decits/surpluses of the trade
and current accounts. This happens among di-
erent countries and regions, Asia is a surplus
region and US are a decit country, but also
inside the same regional areas, the Eurozone
being an obvious example. In the twelve months
up to July 2016 the Eurozone as a whole had
a hefty 3 per cent of GDP surplus in the current
account with a similar decit in the budget ba-
lance, but there were huge disparities within it.
The current account surplus was more than 8 of
the GDP in Germany and it was almost 10 per
cent in the Netherlands.
10
According to the free competitive assumption
and to the ecient market hypothesis these im-
balances should not exist in the long run. With
some simplications we could say that accor-
ding to mainstream theory capitals should ow
from decit to surplus countries. A decit in the
current account implies that these countries
must pay for the extra imports over their exports.
This requires an outow in their nancial ac-
count side of the balance of payment, which co-
rresponds to an inow for the surplus countries.
This type of capital movements should increase
10
Germany current account surplus has been the larg-
est one in the world for many years, also when the Euro was
stronger than in mid 2016.
the exchange rates in surplus economies and
bring it down in the decit ones. Therefore im-
ports from surplus-countries would be more
expensive and exports from decit-countries
would be cheaper, this change in the exchange
rate should help to reduce the imbalances.
Fifth, since the year 2000 in many developing
countries, including Sub-Saharan Africa econo-
mic growth rates are higher than before, howe-
ver young people do not nd appropriate em-
ployment. The situation is particularly severe in
some North Africa and Middle East countries,
from Morocco to Lebanon; in order to absorb all
those entering the labour market these coun-
tries should generate between 2.5 and 3 million
of new jobs every year. Remember that SDG 8
asks for full employment and decent work for all.
In these countries there is a mismatch between
the number of educated people looking for a
job and the ability of the economies to absorb
them; quite often the result is migration. This
fact is extremely worrying because it implies
that even when developing countries invest in
education, they have a high probability to lose
many skilled workers. Education is a funda-
mental component of human development and
it also has huge potentialities to generate inno-
vation and growth, however these potentialities
are curtailed by the unfavourable conditions of
the demand for labour. This is a clear case in
which individual empowerment does not come
through because the external environment re-
present much more a constraint than an oppor-
tunity. Decent work is a typical situation which
can only be achieved if there are improvements
at the personal, micro, level and also in the
general economic conditions of the country or
region, that is to say at the macro level. The wi-
dening of personal capabilities must be accom-
Gianni Vaggi
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panied by a more vibrant and decent labour
market.
C. Neo-Mercantilism
The rst four points above regard mainly high
income countries, so why should developing
countries bother? Unfortunately both stagna-
ting economies and structural imbalances are
stimulating neo-mercantilistic and protectionist
policies; nations ercely compete on interna-
tional markets(see also UNCTAD, 2014, pp.
17-19). Many countries try to overcome these
diculties with deationary policies, which are
made up of strict budgetary policies, compres-
sion of domestic demand and the fostering
of exports. These policies lead to increasing
competition and to neo-protectionist attitudes.
Of course not all countries can run a trade sur-
plus at the same time; Mercantilism is a ze-
ro-sum-game which leads to “beggar thy neigh-
bor” type of policies.
11
East Asian countries and China are often re-
garded as the obvious culprits, mainly because
they keep undervalued exchange rates, which
helps to build current account surpluses and
huge reserves. Export subsidies and import
duties are the traditional protectionist policies,
but we also have selective credit systems, the
management of the exchange rate, tax exemp-
tion on reinvested prots, domestic wages/
incomes compression, subsidies to Research
and Development, product standards, rules of
origin etc.. Needless to say the opposition to
the free movement of people quite often com-
plements neo-protectionist policies.
11
At the beginning of the seventeen century Thomas
Mun a director of the British East India Company wrote“….
we must observe this rule; to sell more to strangers yearly
than we consume of theirs in value.”(Mun,1623?, p. 5). Mun
goes on defending the role of trade with the East-Indies
(ibid., p. 7). In Mun’s balance of trade system a surplus in
foreign trade is the main cause of national wealth.
We must not confuse today Mercantilistic
approach with the lack of competition on in-
ternational markets. During the last thirty years
there have been many newcomers in inter-
national markets, in particular in East Asia.
However, this has very little to do with the idea
of competition characterized by a multitude of
independent producers, this is a competition
among giants. In many sectors: from automo-
tive, to capital equipment, to infrastructure,
to international nance there is a strong con-
centration of productive capacity, also throu-
gh mergers and acquisition. At the world level
these sectors are characterized by oligopo-
listic competition, in which big transnational
companies either organize cartels and lobby
for the state to support them with appropriate
policies.
In 1776 Adam Smith wrote against the alliance
between big corporations and the state becau-
se it could lead to lower growth and it could
also modify the nature of society.
This alliance could perpetuate and even
enlarge the dierences between the di-
erent market players, thus increasing
imbalances instead of reducing them
(see Smith 1776, book IV,iii.c.9-10).
Today economic forces look very powerful and
we must inevitably ask ourselves how all those
nice ideas of development as a complex and
multi-faces process could be put into practice.
How to enlarge people capabilities in an eec-
tive way? Would not people be overwhelmed
by the economic forces and rising inequality?
What about the new SDGs and global partner-
ship? It looks as if on one side we had an ideal
process of development which however risks to
be just in our debates and imagination because
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Making the Sustainable Development Goals Work
on the other side there is the real world, whe-
re capitalist markets continuously reshape the
economic and social structures in which deve-
lopment should take place. In oligopolistic mar-
kets rms try to bend the market mechanisms
to their interests.
International nance too is an example of an
oligopolistic market in which few international
systemic banks play a dominant role, and there
is a sort of Financial Mercantilism(see more in
Vaggi, 2015).
How can Agenda 2030 work in these condi-
tions?
4. On global partnership: dialogue
and negotiations
A. SDG 17: last but not least
We have started the story of development with
just one goal, economic growth, now we have
plenty of goals, targets and indicators; it is clear
that more negotiations are needed and deci-
sions will have to be taken on the priority goals
and on the means of implementation. The suc-
cess of the SDGs will largely depend on and
the way in which the priorities will be chosen
and how they will be supported.
In Table 1 I have organized the 17 goals and
the 169 targets into four clusters, of course it is
possible to group the goals in dierent ways(-
see for instance Loewe and Rippin, 2015, p. 4
and OECD, 2015, p. 48). Some associations
between the ve areas of the 2015 resolution
and the rst three clusters are straightforward
and do not need any comment.
The Environment cluster largely inclu-
des the items in the area called Planet of
the 2015 UN Resolution.
The area People largely overlaps with
the cluster Human Development.
The cluster Economics/Financing
includes both economic issues and -
nancial means of implementation and
it incorporates many targets of the area
Prosperity. This cluster underlines the
economic dimension of sustainability,
but it also refers to the social and econo-
mic structures which might either favour
or constraint the progress towards the
SDGs. Some targets belonging to goals
which appear in the rst two clusters are
classied in the third cluster because
they are related to nancing and to the
means of implementation.
Partnership is the same in the 2015 Re-
solution and in the clusters.
SDG 16 peace and justice comprises
inclusive societies, accountability, insti-
tutions. In view of the many complicated
challenges that it poses SDG 16 could
be in a cluster by itself; it could also be
part of the partnership cluster, because
it has vast implications in terms of global
partnership. We leave it under Human
Development in order to underscore the
human rights aspect and the social di-
mension of peace: peace and justice are
both rights and end-goals in themselves.
Gianni Vaggi
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Table 1
The SDGs and their targets into four clusters
People
Human Development
Planet
Environment
Prosperity
Economics/Financing
Partnership
1. Poverty 1.a
2. Hunger 2.4, 2.5
2.3, 2.4, 2.a, 2.b,
2.c
3. Health 3.9 3.b, 3c
4. Education 4.b
5. Gender 5.4, 5.a
6. Water and sanitation 6. Water and sanitation 6.5 6.a
7.1 7. Energy 7.b 7.a
8.3, 8.5, 8.7, 8.8 8.4, 8.9 8. Inclusive growth 8.a, 8.b, 9.5
9.4 9. Infrastructures 9.a
10.2, 10.3, 10.4, 10.7 10. Reduce inequality 10.6, 10.7, 10.a,
10.b, 10.c
11.1, 11.5, 11.7 11. Cities 11.4, 11.c
12. Sustainable Con-
sumption
and Production
12.1 12.6, 12.7, 12.a,
12.c
13. Climate change 13.1, 13.a
14. Oceans 14.b 14.4, 14.6, 14.7,
14.a, 14.c
15. Territorial ecosys-
tems
15.a, 15.b 15.6, 15.7,
16. Peace, justice
and institutions
16.4 16.3, 16.8
17.7 17.1-17.5, 17.11, 17.12 17. Global
partnership
The cluster classication requires some com-
ments.
First, the targets in grey could t into dierent
clusters, they show that there are many over-
lapping among the dierent goals and that the
large number and the complexity of the targets
require more dialogue and negotiations among
all the stakeholders.
Second, Table 1 explicitly mentions only those
targets which appear in a cluster dierent from
that of the goal they refer too.
Third and most important, most goals and tar-
gets are heavily interconnected, a point often
repeated in the UN September 2015 Reso-
lution(see for instance UN 2015, p. 11, point
55). In general Table 1 shows that many of the
targets included in the rst sixteen goals have
to do with negotiations and require a dialogue
Source: Original elaboration from the author
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Making the Sustainable Development Goals Work
among all stakeholders, this is why they appear
in the partnership cluster.
Whatever the classication of the die-
rent goals without a serious partnership
made up of a continuous dialogue and
thorough negotiations the SDGs will lar-
gely stay on paper.
The need to negotiate the actual cooperation
policies plus the considerations of section III on
the growing economic imbalances imply that
“the global partnership for sustainable develo-
pment” of SDG 17 should be based on a basic
principle:
to re-balance the economic and power
relationships between the dierent ac-
tors.
This paper strongly contents that the re-balan-
cing of negotiating powers is the only principle
which could lead to an eective partnership
and hopefully could lead to improvement on the
road to the SDGs by 2030. This is because of
two facts with which Agenda 2030 has to con-
front itself:
rst, the to the complexity and to the in-
terconnectedness of all goals and targets,
which is also represented in Table 1;
second, the variety and the existing dieren-
ces among all the stakeholders, see chart 1.
These two conditions cannot be by-passed and
must be accepted as aspects of the real world
in which Agenda 2030 must be implemented.
The two conditions also explain why it might be
dicult to have a real and eective partnership
for development. Re-balancing is an attempt
to put the dialogue and negotiations which are
the content of the partnership on a more rea-
listic footing; on one side it acknowledges the
existing dierences and on the other it tries to
overcome them.
Probably international cooperation will not cea-
se to be mainly donor-driven, but the role of
traditional donors will become less and less re-
levant and more voices from the ‘global south’
will make themselves heard. In order to have a
useful dialogue it is necessary to give concre-
te substance to global partnership, subsection
V.B. will provide some examples.
SDG 17 says: strengthen the means of imple-
mentation and revitalize the global partnership
for sustainable development, with 19 targets
and three systemic issues, see Table 2.
Table 2
SDG 17 and its composition
5 Groups 12 targets in the rst 4 groups 7 targets in the 3 systemic issues
Finance 5
Technology 3
Capacity building 1
Trade 3
Systemic issues 3 Policy and institutional coherence
2 Multi-stakeholder partnership
2 Data monitoring and accountability
Source: Original elaboration from the author
Gianni Vaggi
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How to make it work? Empowerment, owners-
hip and global partnership require that coopera-
tion should be a dialogue among less unequal
partners. At the moment partners are very much
dierent in terms of wealth, trade and nancial
capacities, knowledge. The re-balancing of
negotiating capacities should be the leading
principle in order to achieve an eective global
partnership.
This process of re-balancing requires at least
three steps.
Step 1: country ownership.
Faced with a lot of goals and targets each coun-
try will have to decide its priorities; it is hard to
imagine Malawi moving ahead on all SDGs
and their targets. There must be a mechanism
which should lead to identication of the coun-
try’s main objectives.
Countries in the south should set their
own agenda. Something like this, even if not
so clearly stated, is mentioned in target 17.15
which asks for no donors’ driven programs at
the country level. This is not so simple as it mi-
ght appear, because some decisions could not
be at harmony with the opinion of the ‘donors’. It
is easy to imagine situations in which the die-
rent stakeholders could have dierent priorities.
The whole process might require procedures,
negotiations and a lot of time and truthfulness
by all the sides involved.
Step 2: trilateral dialogue
Dialogue and negotiations will take place
among traditional donors and recipient coun-
tries but not only. There are the so called “new
donors” which are mainly countries, such as the
BRICS and other emerging economies, but the-
re are also other stakeholders which can pro-
vide both resources and technical assistance:
development banks, philanthropy institutions,
sovereign funds, private investors, business
people. In principle all these actors should dis-
cuss and agree on the most appropriate deve-
lopment policies, see Chart 1.
If global partnership must be eective then the
outcomes of the various forums from Rome
2003 to the Addis Ababa conference on Fi-
nancing for Development of July 2015 should
be adopted by all stakeholders. Old and New
donors should give the same message and
agree on the various aid eectiveness criteria,
the main issue being policy coherence in coo-
peration activities and coherence also between
trade and aid policies. All the principles which
have been agreed during the several forums of
the years two thousand at the OECD-DAC level,
see section II.B. above, should be accepted by
all donors, old and new ones. This policy cohe-
rence by old and new donors is not at all easy;
a lot of aid and loans are still ‘tide’, but consider
also labour standards and migrants’ rights, tax
competition to attract investments and so on.
Moreover it is not just a matter of making ‘new
donor countries’ to agree on these principles,
but to involve also several very dierent private
institutions.
Step 3 is the core of the argument and requires
a section on its own.
B. Step 3: universality and dierentiation
and the need for policy space
Consultations and dialogue should allow deve-
loping countries more negotiating power. This
follows from the need of re-balancing a situa-
tion with large asymmetries. When the parties
are very much dierent in terms of resources,
capacities and power, the re-balancing of these
52
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Making the Sustainable Development Goals Work
powers helps to guarantee a fairer game; this
process might require limitations for the most
powerful actors and additional possibilities for
the weaker parties.
Re-balancing is needed because of the exis-
ting asymmetries which are neither eliminated
nor reduced by market forces. The principle of
re-balancing is the logical consequences of the
two principles of universality and dierentiation
which are often quoted in the UN 2015 Reso-
lution, but which also appear in other ocial
documents(see for instance ERD, 2015 pp.
310-. and UN-SR, 2014, n. 84). Universali-
ty means that SDGs are for all countries and
for all people, not just for the poorer countries
and all stakeholders should be committed to
them. Dierentiation recognizes that contribu-
tions to the achievement of the SDGs depend
on the dierent capacities and needs of the
dierent countries. The principle of common
but dierentiated responsibility derives from
the Rio+20 conference(see for instance Bola-
ji-Adio, 2015, pp. 2, 8).
These considerations imply full use of policy
space by developing countries (SDG 17.15,
see also UNCTAD, 2014 and Eurodad, 2014);
they must be allowed to implement policies and
actions which could reduce the distance with
both high income countries and the emerging
economic powers.
Let us indicate some of the main areas where
policy space is needed and on which human
and institutional capacities should focus, in
brackets the reference to some specic targets
which appear in the SDGs.
1. Trade, Special and Dierential Treatment
(10.a)
2. Industrial policies: Export, Taxes, Invest-
ments, exchange rate
3. Decent work, Migrations (8.8, 10.7, 10.c)
4. Public nances and budget: tax system,
subsidies
5. Social protection systems (1.3).
Let me examine the implementation of policy
space in three main areas: trade relations, in-
dustrial and budgetary policies, social protec-
tion systems.
First, trade relations are a typical case in
which applying the same rules to players with
enormous dierences as to their economic
structure and productive capacity would be
against fairness and probably would also lead
to inecient outcomes.
Following the Uruguay Round Agreement and
the establishment of the World Trade Organi-
zation in 1995 the possibility for developing
countries to intervene in foreign trade has been
greatly constrained. Trade negotiations have to
be based on the principle of reciprocity among
all trading partners and this has generated
some paradoxical situations.
12
As UNCTAD points out (see UNCTAD 2014
pp.82-.) some exibility still exists particularly
for developing countries. These exceptions to
the general obligations which are incorporated
into the main trade agreements go under the
name of special and dierential treatment,
SDT. However, far from being an exception SDT
should be the norm in so far as it helps to re-ba-
lance the very large dierences in productive
12
The group of UN experts on nancing for develop-
ment asks for trade and investment rules to be geared
towards the sustainable development of poorer countries
(see UN-ICESDF, 2014, pp. 41-42).
Gianni Vaggi
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capacities of high income and emerging eco-
nomies on one side and of Low Income and
Least Developed countries on the other. SDT
in trade is mentioned in SDG 10.a. The major
problems do not concern trade in goods and
services, but international agreements on pro-
perty rights, investments, dispute settlements,
nancial services in general.
The 2001 Everything But Arms, EBA, EU
approach to trade with developing countries is a
good example of Special and Dierential Treat-
ment; EBA implies duty-free and quota-free
imports to the EU from the Least Developed
Countries, but for armaments.
Regional integration and coordination
among countries in the south would also
greatly help the process of re-balancing die-
rent negotiating powers. The Economic Part-
nership Agreements, EPAs, originating out of
the Cotonou agreement of 2000 between the
EU and the group of African, Caribbean, Paci-
c, ACP, countries have acknowledged the prin-
ciple that negotiations take place between the
EU and regional groups and not with individual
countries. Unfortunately it took more than ten
years of negotiations to reach some nal agree-
ments(see Vaggi and Evans 2002).
Regional integration would help developing
countries to achieve a stronger negotiating po-
sition and it would encourage the countries to
establish regular procedures for consultations
at the regional level(see Ramsamy, et al. 014).
Think of infrastructures, energy, logistic, all is-
sues which should be dealt with at a suprana-
tional level. African countries are trying to have
a common strategy also on SDG 16 which fo-
cus on good governance and peace(see Bola-
ji-Adio, 2015, pp. vi, 11).
Second, industrial and budgetary policies
are among the most important policy tools to
be used to reduce the productive capacity ga-
p(see UNCTAD, 2014, p. 92). Industrial policies
have been widely adopted in East Asia, but in
the past also in OECD countries. The govern-
ment intervenes to promote technological in-
novations and to sustain exports, this can be
done with direct subsidies and tax exemptions
but also through favourable credit conditions.
Special Economic Zones are an example of
active industrial policies, mainly designed to
attract Foreign Direct Investments, FDIs which
are extremely popular in developing econo-
mies. Inside these zones labour relations and
labour standards hardly adhere to those recom-
mended by ‘decent work’, which is part of SDG
8. ECLAC ask for the possibility to implement
environmentally-focused industrial policies(see
ECLAC, 2016 p. 70).
In order to implement these policies and also to
ght poverty developing countries need scal
space, that is to say a budgetary policy which is
countercyclical and in particular it allows coun-
tries to expand public expenditures in periods of
declining growth(see ECLAC, 2016, pp. 67-8).
The scal system is another important dimen-
sion of the policy space(see UNCTAD, 2014 pp.
161-2). Developing countries still derive a lot of
their public revenues from taxes on foreign tra-
de and from indirect taxation in general. Tax re-
venues are already the largest domestic source
of nance in Africa with a tax to GDP ratio of
17%, OECD countries have a 35% or more(see
Mackie, and Williams 2015, p.7). However the
tax composition needs to be improved. Develo-
ping countries need to widen their tax base and
to rely more on income taxes, not to mention
wealth taxes, but raising domestic resources
54
Revista Internacional de Cooperación y Desarrollo Vol. 3 No. 2 | Año 2016 | PP. 35-59
Making the Sustainable Development Goals Work
for development is a big challenge(see Touray,
2014). To increase the public revenue from inco-
mes takes time and implies major advances in
good governance and also in administrative ca-
pacities. Without major improvement in tax co-
llection and in the scal system in general there
is no way to have a more equitable society and
to reduce the dependence from foreign funds.
Of course the shift towards a more ecient and
more equitable tax systems would require time
and support from foreign stakeholders.
More policy space for Low Income and Lower
Middle Income countries implies granting them
the possibility to adopt active policies to promo-
te development, with a direct involvement of the
government
13
. The active role of the state in pro-
moting domestic productive capacities and in
strengthening the country’s position in foreign
trade might look like a neo-mercantilist policy.
However, there is a major dierence between
the developmental role of the state in develo-
ping countries and neo-mercantilism:
the former aims at reducing the distan-
ces between Low and High Income
countries;
the latter aims at maintaining and even
enlarging these dierences.
In Upper Middle Income Countries which
have already reached decent levels of income
per capita the developmental role of the state
should focus on domestic demand and on its
composition.
Third, social protection systems, SPS, in
Europe we could use the term ‘welfare system’.
Social protection is meant to avoid the worse-
13
On the developmental role of the state in Asian eco-
nomic growth see Wade, 1990.
ning of the conditions of the poorest people,
remember that the rst transformative shift of
the High Level Panel document is leave no one
behind (see UN-HLP, 2013). Social protection
for those who have more diculties is a way to
re-balance an unfair, may be even dangerous,
situation and it ts well with the general princi-
ple of reducing the dierences and giving more
opportunities to the weakest social groups.
Social protection oors are mentioned in the
document by the group of experts on develo-
pment nance (see UN-ICESDF, 2014, p. 22),
where we also nd the term global safety nets
(ibid., p. 44), an expression which had already
been used during the debt crisis of the eighties.
Europe could provide a major contribution to
this debate because in many ways the welfare
system is a unique social and political experi-
ment of Europe. The welfare system originated
in Europe during the last century and in most
High Income Countries it achieved major re-
sults in the years between 1945 and 1980(see
Piketty, 2013), contributing to the emergence of
what we call ‘middle class’. The challenges are
straightforward:
will this welfare system survive in the
countries where it exists?
will it be extended to emerging/develo-
ping countries?
The Eurodad-Ibis position paper for the 2015
Addis Ababa conference on Financing for De-
velopment stresses the issue that a compre-
hensive system of social protection is already
part of the commitment of the UN states(see
Eurodad-Ibis, 2015, p.6).
Gianni Vaggi
55
Revista Internacional de Cooperación y Desarrollo Vol. 3 No. 2 | Año 2016 | PP. 35-59
A nal point on dialogue and negotiation. The
rise of international nance is more worrying
that that of East Asia. In the latter case there are
countries and governments with whom it is ne-
cessary to carry on a dialogue on many relevant
partnership issues, such as climate change, hu-
man rights, labour conditions, trade regulations
etc. The partners are well identied and there are
also forums where debates could take place.
In the case of nance it is much less clear who
the partners are and how to have a debate.
Where are the institutional settings for the ne-
gotiations? We all know the big international
investment banks, but there are a myriad of di-
erent types of funds, some nancial centers,
such as Wall Street and the City, and other os-
hore centers. Capital, not labour, is fully mobile
across countries and the number and types of
nancial products continuously increase. Most
derivative products are not traded in regulated
nancial markets, but they are negotiated ‘Over
The Counter’, that is to say with agreements
and contracts between two or more parties and
without any type of supervisory authority. How
is it possible to open a dialogue for develop-
ment with these international nancial inves-
tors? We know how volatile nancial ows are
and how dangerous this volatility has been for
developing countries(see Akyuz, 2005). Inows
can be either a blessing or a curse, but unfortu-
nately since the capital ows to Latin America
of the late seventies we have seen a lot of capi-
tal reversal, or outows which have had terrible
consequences on developing countries. This
was the case during the big debt crises of the
eighties, Argentina had similar problems be-
tween 1995 and 2001 and even recently some
African countries risk economic crises because
of their international debts.
Conclusions
Steps 1, 2 and 3 will never materialize without
good governance, not only in the sense of avoi-
ding or at least limiting corruption, but also in
terms of institutional and administrative capaci-
ty. Target 16.a mentions the need to “streng-
then relevant national institutions… for building
capacities at all level”. Without major improve-
ments in administrative and institutional capa-
cities it would be impossible to achieve the new
SDGs and global partnership for sustainable
development will be an empty statement.
Re-balancing plus the improvement of institu-
tional capacities in developing countries should
prevent the widening of the gap between the
partners and smooth the existing dierences.
Re-balancing is in line with Montesquieu’s fa-
mous tripartite division of powers, without this
separation there is no freedom(see Montes-
quieu, 1748 vol. 1 p.164). Checks and balances
imply the existence of counteracting forces: “In
order to avoid that someone abuses of power, it
is necessary that, in the state of things, power
obstruct power” (ibid., pp. 162-3).
Economic growth could produce checks and
balances and it might reduce dierences, but it
could also increase distances and concentrate
economic power into few big rms. There is no
automatic trickle down mechanism of economic
growth; free trade and free capital movements
cannot guarantee that the development goals
will be achieved. Free trade is an extremely
powerful mechanism and after centuries of
wars in Europe Montesquieu could even wri-
te that “the natural consequence of trade is to
bring peace”(ibid., vol. 2, p. 8). More than two
centuries later referring to Montesquieu Hirsch-
man will speak of doux commerce, sweet trade,
56
Revista Internacional de Cooperación y Desarrollo Vol. 3 No. 2 | Año 2016 | PP. 35-59
Making the Sustainable Development Goals Work
as a formidable argument for capitalism(see
Hirschman, 1977, p. 60). However trade could
also be quite sour and the same for nance.
Development is no automatic by product of
economic growth, positive actions and policis
are needed to generate more equitable and
inclusive societies. Goals are like a lighthouse
showing the direction; economy, nance and
even politics are the ocean in which we have
to navigate. SDG 17 on global partnership is
about the rules on the boat.
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