Source: Dreher and Fuchs (2012)

When conducting econometric research about foreign aid budget allocation, Gupta et al. (2006) recommend grouping foreign aid budget allocation and projects by phases, and not by single year, due to aid volatility. Following this suggestion, I estimate the relative importance of each region of the developing world for China foreign aid budget allocation in the six phases described in the first section, using datasets from Dreher and Fuchs (2012) and AidData (Hawkins, 2010). Conducting this exercise allows to visually represent the relative importance of Latin America and the Caribbean across time, as compared to other developing regions.

Figure 3 – Chinese aid to different developing regions (number of completed projects as % of total)

As illustrated in Figure 3, Sub-Saharan Africa is constantly the greatest recipient of Chinese project aid, accounting for more than 40% of projects throughout all phases. East Asia and Pacific, important due to geographical proximity, is the second region most benefitted, in the first, fifth and sixth phases. Latin America and the Caribbean received less aid than both the Middle East and North Africa and South Asia in the first three phases, until the fall of Soviet Union. It is only after 1990 that China increased the relative number of projects in the LAC region, which is in line with those regions in the fourth, fifth and sixth phases, obtaining around 10% of total Chinese aid projects. Coming to the amounts of aid, as shown by Figure 4 below, we can see that the share of Chinese aid allocated to Latin America and Caribbean has passed from less than 5% to 20% of its total budget, and it is now comparable with the amount of aid received by Sub-Saharan Africa. These combined figures show that Chinese aid has a special focus on Sub-Saharan Africa, especially regarding the number of projects; nevertheless, it maintains a global outlook, providing substantial levels of aid to all developing regions. Looking at LAC in particular, we can appreciate that while the share of aid projects remained substantially constant, the amount of aid provided has sharply increased in the last decade, reflecting the fact that greater attention is dedicated to the region, and bigger financial flows are dedicated by China to LAC, both in absolute terms and relative to the rest of the world.

Figure 4 – Chinese aid to different developing regions (number of completed projects as % of total)

Types of aid - Beginning in the 1990s, the reform of methods for providing aid to the outside world was deepened, diversifying and making them more flexible. The types of aid provided by China to the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean can be divided into six types: (i) humanitarian assistance, (ii) free material assistance, (iii) preferential loans, (iv) infrastructure construction, (v) vocational training programs and (vi) support to local organizations. They are summarized below:

i) First, humanitarian assistance was rapidly developed in emergency situations. China provided timely assistance, both financially and through donations/shipments of medical equipment, among others. Between 2003 and 2010, according to Chinese State Council, China has provided this type of assistance on more than 30 occasions to countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, including Cuba, Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru, Chile and Haiti. Of these, and despite having not yet established formal diplomatic relations with China, Haiti was conceded 93 million yuan (approximately 13.7 million 2010 USD) after the devastating earthquake of 2010 (State Council, 2011). In 2012, China helped Cuba to relief the consequences of hurricane Sandy, providing 100 tons of humanitarian aid (State Council, 2014)

ii) There has also been a significant increase in free material assistance. According to official data, in the 1990s, China made over 30 donations of industrial supplies, such as bicycles, agricultural and/or medical equipment, among others; between 2000 and 2008, this type of aid has multiplied, registering almost 50 donations, including telecommunications equipment, office supplies, cultural and sporting goods, and others, with an increasingly high technological content (State Council, 2011). Between 2010 and 2012, under the Strengthening Environmental Protection program addressing climate change, China donated energy-efficient products to the Caribbean island of Grenada (State Council, 2014).

iii) Preferential loans play a predominant role in foreign aid. Prior to 1995, China’s assistance to Latin America consisted primarily of interest-free loans. Since the end of the 1990s, especially between 2003 and 2008, aid has been extended to preferential loans which has been granted on 23 occasions to 11 countries, including the Bahamas, Guyana, Suriname and Bolivia. As for the reduction and elimination of foreign debt, in 2006 China cancelled all the debts of Guyana (which had expired at the end of 2004) and two debts of Bolivia (which were due to expire in 2007) (State Council, 2011).

iv) Fourth, between 2003 and 2008, China has carried out several infrastructure construction projects in Latin America. Among the more than 40 works of this type carried out in 15 countries (such as Cuba, the Bahamas or Granada), the projects that stand out the most are the stadiums, convention centers, highways, hydroelectric power stations, hospitals and agricultural production centers (State Council, 2011). By 2012, China had offered concessional loans for the construction of infrastructure projects in the Caribbean nations, totaling 3 billion yuan (450 million USD) (State Council, 2014).

v) Vocational training programs have also increased, becoming an important element of China’s external assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean, focusing on sectors such as agriculture, mining, trade and administration. The implementation of these training programs has been accompanied by the participation of many young Chinese volunteers to provide assistance in diverse fields such as education, agriculture and medicine (State Council, 2011).

vi) Sixth and last, China has begun to provide assistance to local Latin American organizations: between 1998 and 2002, China made numerous donations to the Caribbean Development Bank; in July 2005, they donated computer equipment to the secretariat of the Andean Community; between 2005 and 2009, a $ 2million USD grant established the China-Organization of American States (OAS) fund; finally, in January 2009 China donated $350 USD million to the Inter-American Development Bank to support economic development and poverty reduction in Latin America and the Caribbean (State Council, 2011).

III. Motivations behind China’s aid allocation

China prides itself that its aid is unconditional, not linked to conditions normally imposed by Western donors, such as good practices, democracy and/or respect for human rights. In addition, Chinese financial assistance usually becomes readily available, without much bureaucracy (Davies, 2007). China therefore constitutes a good alternative to the donors of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC-CAD), with their very detailed bureaucratic procedures and conditionality policies. The best evidence of the preference for unconditional aid in Africa is the case of Angola, a country with very high levels of corruption, which has big difficulties to access Western aid; unsurprisingly, a major recipient of Chinese aid5. In Latin America, for instance, Chinese aid to Venezuela has occupied the void generated by the shortage of loans by the World Bank. Nevertheless, unconditional aid to oil-rich countries such as Venezuela and Angola can increase the risk of political disruption and corruption (Sanderson, 2013; Ellis, 2009; Brautigam, 2009). At the same time, China’s development aid is criticized for being driven by domestic economic and political interests, to a greater extent than development assistance from traditional DAC donors.

The motives that generally move all donor countries to the granting of international aid can be grouped into three categories: (i) first, aid must depend on need of recipients; (ii) secondly, the quality of recipient’s policies and institutions could be important; and (iii) third, the donor’s own political and commercial interests play a role (Alesina & Dollar, 2000). The following paragraphs discuss these three groups of motives, focusing on the case of China.

i) In relation to poverty and development, the Ministry of Commerce (1985, p.413) stresses how its aid projects play “a positive role in the expansion of the national economies of the recipient countries and the improvement of the material and cultural life of people in these countries”. The Ministry emphasizes the idea of “mutual benefit”, in order to develop national economies of recipient countries and to promote economic growth both in China and those countries (Ministry of Commerce, 1985, p.413). The Chinese State Council underlines how the budget allocation of its aid meets the needs of the recipients, saying that China assigns primary importance to recipient countries living conditions and economic development, setting efforts to ensure that its foreign aid benefits as many people in need as possible (State Council, 2011, p.6). Brautigam (2008) points out that China uses its foreign aid to show its vision-of-self as a great power that is responsible, meaningful, fast in humanitarian aid delivery (p.7). Chinese focus on infrastructure projects could assess development needs largely neglected by DAC donors (Brautigam, 2008). However, these views contradict to a large extent what is argued by Naim (2007), that “rogue” donors like China don’t care about the long-term well-being of the population of recipient countries (p.95).

ii) The second group of motivations to donate aid is related to the quality of institutions and the governance of recipient countries. This is true when we talk about donor countries from the West, for two main reasons. First, (a) traditional donor countries use aid as an incentive mechanism for recipient countries with good institutions; for example, Öhler et al. (2012) find that aid conditional on “good governance” leads to incentives for potential recipient countries to improve their anti-corruption controls. Nevertheless, others raise questions about the effectiveness of aid for the promotion of democracy and governance (Knack, 2004, Busse and Gröning, 2009). Second, (b) traditional donors may follow a general belief that aid is more effective when it is assigned to recipients with more rigorous economic policies (Burnside and Dollar 2000), although there is not enough empirical evidence to support this relationship (Easterly et al., 2004). In contrast to the motivations of Western donors’ aid, one of the fundamental principles of China’s aid policy, and in general for its foreign policy, is the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs and respect for national sovereignty of recipient countries (Davies, 2007; Brautigam, 2008; Dreher & Fuchs, 2012). As such, Chinese aid allocation is unrelated to the form of regime and quality of governance of recipients. The Ministry of Commerce (1990, p.63) states that China has “full respect” for the sovereignty of recipient countries, and doesn’t attach any condition or ask for any privilege, maintaining the “true spirit of sincere cooperation”. Therefore, we can conclude that Chinese aid is probably not affected by the institutional and governance quality of recipient countries. Others have even argued that China, priding itself over its “no-strings-attached” approach tends to focus instead on recipients with fairly bad governance (Halper, 2010), providing assistance to unstable problematic regions and “delinquent states” (Pehnelt, 2007, p.8). In fact, China gives considerable amounts of aid to fragile states (Kaplinsky et al, 2007; Bermeo, 2011). It has been argued that the absence of any conditionality of Chinese aid could weaken democracy, governance and human rights, limit development, weaken social and environmental standards, and increase corruption (Davies 2007). According to Taylor (1998), in fact, China has opposed democratization in Africa, since it could use the failure of democratic consolidation as an argument against domestic demands for democratization. As Deng Xiaoping said, “talk about human rights, freedom and democracy is only designed to safeguard the interests of the strong, rich countries [who] practice power politics” (as quoted by Taylor, ١٩٩٨, p.٤٥٣). However, it is debatable whether China’s aid differs significantly from the distribution of DAC aid in terms of rewarding countries with better governance: earlier studies reveal a considerable difference between the rhetoric of DAC and its effective allocation of aid. For example, Germany, Finland, France, Japan and the Netherlands give the most corrupt countries more aid, not less (Isopi & Mattesini, 2010). 

iii) Finally, the offering of foreign assistance is composed of (a) economic and (b) political motives. On the one hand, (a) in terms of its own economic and commercial interests, everything that facilitates the export of natural resources to China is seen as a central objective of its aid; China’s “insatiable needs” for resources (hydrocarbons, minerals, and timber in particular) are more often cited as trade-related reasons for Chinese foreign aid (Alden, 2005; Davies, 2007; Naim, 2007; Halper, 2010). The Chinese Ministry of Commerce is the lead agency for the provision of bilateral aid: this clearly indicates the paramount importance of trade ratios for China. Lum et al. (2009) suggest that Chinese aid to Africa and Latin America is determined by economic interests, motivated mainly by the extraction of natural resources. The vast majority of Latin American exports to China have focused on three areas: soy, metals and hydrocarbons. In fact, only three products (copper, iron and soy) account for more than half of Latin American exports to China. Chinese trade’s exponential growth has created strong ties with Latin America and potential to become a key trading partner. Brazil has become the third largest exporter of iron to China, while Chile and Peru account for 50% of Chinese imports of copper. In 2009, seeking increased oil exports, the Chinese government approved a $20 billion credit to Venezuela and purchased the Brazilian share of Repsol (a Spanish oil company) for $7.1 billion USD, with the aim of developing oil deposits in Brazil (Dowsett & Chen, 2010). Furthermore, Gallagher (2012) estimates that loans-for-oil constitute more than two-thirds of Chinese loans to Latin America. This process of increasing Chinese investments in Latin America began in 2004, when President Hu Jintao promised to invest over a 10-year period intending to reach bilateral trade of $100 billion USD. Surprisingly, this mark was surpassed much earlier, as bilateral trade had already reached $140 billion in 2008 and $261.6 billion USD in 2014. At the moment, the US remains the main economic partner of the region; China surpassed the European Union as the second largest trading partner in Latin America in 2014 (two years earlier than what CEPAL predicted in 2011), and could even surpass the US by 2030 (Hakim and Myers, 2014). Nevertheless, Latin America’s lack of diversification and dependence on products exported to China has exacerbated the region’s vulnerability to commodity price fluctuations, as up to 74% of all Latin American exports to China are primary commodities (Gallagher, 2010). In contrast, the majority of Chinese exports to Latin America are from the manufacturing sector with a strong emphasis on electronics and vehicles; such industries, as compared to commodities, are much less prone to price volatility, evidencing an asymmetric trade relationship. As some scholars put it, Chinese trade is pushing Latin America into a “raw materials corner”. More bluntly, Chinese focus on Latin American raw materials and the flood of cheap Chinese products is precluding the diversification of the exporting industries of Latin American nations, since it is more lucrative to merely sell raw materials to China than encourage entrepreneurship and diversification of the economy, thus stimulating an unfavorable “overdependence on natural resource exports”. As the NAFTA negotiator from Nicaragua put it, “China is an awakening monster that can eat us” (as cited in Gallagher & Porzecanski, 2008, p.185).

In addition to secure resources, Chinese aid is accused of directing future access to export markets and profitable investments6 (Davies, 2007; Lum et al., 2009). Devlin (2007) provides statistics about the one-sided relationship, describing how Chile, Argentina, and Mexico were the only Latin American countries among China’s top 40 suppliers in 2002, altogether accounting for just 1.3 percent of total imports. On the contrary, Latin America has become the most dynamic export market for Chinese products, with an annual growth of 31% between 2005 and 2010, versus 16% for the rest of the world (Toro, 2013; Smith et al., 2013; Gallagher, 2008); thus the Sino-Latin American trade is characterized by a substantial trade deficit.

Figure 5 - China-LAC bilateral trade

China’s exports to world regions	Product composition of LAC exports to China
China’s imports from world regions	Product composition of China’s exports to LAC

Source: CEPAL, 2009; Leiteritz, 2012.

Furthermore, most Chinese aid is “tied aid”, which is another indication that China uses foreign aid to improve its business opportunities (Pehnelt, 2007; Schüller et al., 2010).  For instance, when China funded the construction of 2.2 billion USD dam in Ecuador, over 1,000 Chinese engineers and workers were deployed to the Latin American country, rather than hiring Ecuadorian workers (Krauss & Bradsher, 2015). The Ministry of Trade (1999) openly concluded that, through aid, Chinese enterprises entered developing countries’ markets very quickly and were welcomed by those countries’ governments and enterprises (p.75).

On the other hand, (b) regarding the political motivations of China’s aid allocation, the Ministry of Commerce (1996) openly admits that aid and subsidies are used to coordinate diplomatic work, and that building “some public institutions [...] produced great political influences” (p.70). The aid program is aimed at supporting diplomatic high - level events: for example, to achieve greater participation of heads of State in the ceremonies of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, China speeded up the implementation of the projects most valued by bilateral leaders (Ministry of Commerce, 2009, p.348). However, according to the State Council (2011), China “never uses foreign aid as a means to [...] seek political privileges for itself” (p.3). As a matter of fact, the literature has paid particular attention to the political motivation of allocating aid from China. For instance, Africa is important for China’s political agenda and building alliances, as it supported the People’s Republic to represent China at the United Nations instead of Taiwan (Davies, 2007, p.27). Taiwan, considered by China a nonaligned province, has diplomatic relations with only twenty countries, with embassies, trade agreements and foreign aid, which strengthen Taiwan’s effective sovereignty. The largest group of those countries (eleven, as shown by Table 1 below) is in Latin America and the Caribbean, particularly in Central America, which maintain this arrangement because Taiwan spends heavily to maintain it. Nevertheless, Taiwan can difficultly outspend mainland China, which uses the aid to impose its “One China policy”, rewarding countries that do not recognize Taiwan as a separate country (Taylor, ١٩٩٨; Brautigam, 2008, Rich, 2009). That has been evident in LAC, where China invested in costly projects, sometimes in exchange for ending diplomatic relations with Taiwan; Panama, has been the latest country in switching recognition from Taiwan to the PRC in June 2017. However, despite the “one China” policy, the PRC also provides aid to countries that recognize Taiwan (Davies, 2007).

Table 2 – Countries recognizing the PRC or the ROC in Latin America and the Caribbean in June 2017

Source: Compiled by the author based on information from the Ministry of Foreign Relations of the Republic of China (Taiwan) website: http://www.mofa.gov.tw/

Finally, because of its problematic human rights record, China has supported African countries to play an important role in preventing sanctions against the Asian country (Lancaster, 2007) in organizations such as the UN Human Rights Commission. China, in fact, seems determined to increase its influence in such international organizations (Taylor, 1998), in order to “build coalitions to protect Beijing from criticism from the West” (Tull, 2006, p.460).

In summary, there are four main factors that encompass the economic and political interests of China in Latin America and the Caribbean (Ellis, 2009): (1) acquiring primary products, (2) cultivating markets for Chinese exports, (3) gaining international isolation of Taiwan, and (4) securing strategic alliance with Latin America.

However, following the win-win doctrine of Chinese foreign aid, Latin America also fulfils its own strategic interests in its relationship with China, for three reasons: (1) creating export-led economic growth, (2) attracting investment in hydrocarbon exploration and development, and (3) counterbalancing the hegemony of the United States (Ellis, 2009; Hearn & León-Manríquez, 2011).

IV. Potential developments

Chinese aid has been considered as the most “rogue” aid among new donors (Naim, 2007), since it is used to gain diplomatic and political support on the international scene, it is allocated in order to gain access to raw materials and natural resources and open new markets for its own manufactured products, and it is assigned to fragile and corrupt countries undermining the effort of western donors towards better governance and rule of law. However, aid from DAC and other emerging donors has been found to be motivated by political self-interest as well. While all donors use aid to further their strategic interests, China is more open in stressing that its aid is favoring its own model of development and that it is aimed at mutual benefit. It is clear that Chinese cooperation with LAC doesn’t follow the traditional rhetoric of giving aid on a humanitarian basis, but it privileges a South-South cooperation approach, based on the exchange of resources, technology, and knowledge between developing countries perceived as equals, and without obligations (since there is no colonial history among them). China’s commitment to such approach is underlined by the fact that the first time that Chinese Government has signed an agreement with a multilateral partner, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in 2010, it has been with the aim of strengthening South-South cooperation. As president Xi Jinping himself described it, while chairing a a South-South meeting at the UN, South-South cooperation is “a great pioneering measure uniting the developing nations together for self-improvement, is featured by equality, mutual trust, mutual benefit, win-win result, solidarity and mutual assistance and can help developing nations pave a new path for development and prosperity” and “as the overall strength of developing nations improves, the South-South cooperation is set to play a bigger role in promoting the collective rise of developing countries.” 7 Indeed, the relationship between China and Latin America and the Caribbean in the past decades can indeed be described as a win-win relation: while Latin America needs Chinese foreign aid money and needs a buyer for its abundant raw materials, China needs natural resources and wants to enter developing markets to place its manufactured products. As it has been suggested in the course of this article, LAC experimented both positive and negative impacts from Chinese foreign aid and bilateral trade. Positive impacts include an increased funding for a number of infrastructure project and increased trade revenues. However, negative impacts could potentially outweigh positive effects: the imbalances in the relationship and the fluctuations in the raw material demand and prices, show that China alone may not be enough to sustain the development of entire economies in the region, which risk falling in the “resource curse”. Chinese money also influences the stability and the transparency of the region: on the one hand, Chinese aid may help to sustain corrupt, unethical and inefficient regimes; on the other hand, it may also contribute to the stability of regimes more committed to democracy. As such, the tendencies of retrogression into undiversified and deindustrialized economies dependent on non-renewable raw resources and the increase of corruption prompted by Chinese unconditional aid and unbalanced trade, could undermine the efforts of traditional donors (i.e. World Bank and IMF) towards better governance in the region.

Some authors are optimistic (Devlin, 2007; Toro, 2013) and hypothesize that Chinese aid and trade can sustain the development of Latin America and the Caribbean, providing economic growth, a strategic economic model and a strong trade partner. The World Bank (De la Torre et al., 2011) supports the hypothesis of a sustained long-term economic growth “made in China” even after the 2008 economic crisis, assuming that Chinese growth is long-lasting and stable. In fact, the growing relation between China and LAC provides an historic opportunity to the region for unprecedented progress to rebalance its gaps in productivity, innovation, infrastructure, logistics, and capacity-building. Cooperation with China, in the context of the 2015-2019 Cooperation Plan, could lead to a rethinking of the regional industrial policy, leading to a greater processing of raw materials, better linked to manufacturing and services sectors, and fuelling intraregional trade (Leiteritz, 2012).

Others authors, on the contrary, have a more pessimistic approach, and maintain that Chinese unconditional aid and trade, while triggering short-term growths in Latin American economies, will not be able to sustain them in the long-term. Chinese “no-strings attached” approach towards developing regions is detrimental of business’s best-practices, human rights and good governance (Roett & Paz, 2008, Curran, 2016). Unconditional aid will continue to represent an alternative to conditional Western foreign aid, hindering governance reforms and allowing corruption and inefficiencies to survive, especially in resource rich countries. Furthermore, a concentration on raw resources combined with an increased competition from China in manufacturing markets could discourage innovative technologies and productivity, sparking fears of “deindustrialization” in the region, in particular in Brazil and Chile (Hearn & León-Manríquez, 2011, p.246). The deceleration of Chinese economy (which “only” grew by a 7% in 2015 and by 6.9% in 2016), slowing down Chinese demand of raw materials and causing a drop in their price, intensifies doubts about long-term sustainability of the Sino-Latin American relationship.

Conclusion

During the last decade, China has risen as a very visible actor in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). It has done so in a variety of manners, mainly through its foreign aid, its investments and its bilateral trade. The first section of this article provided an overview of the historical evolution of Chinese aid to the region, showing how Chinese cooperation, from a series of small actions directed mainly to communist countries all around the world, became a full scale worldwide aid program, active in all regions of the developing world; furthermore, it summarized the approach to cooperation with LAC for each phase. The second section of this article offered an attempt to quantify the amount of Chinese aid received by LAC as compared to other developing regions, confirming the worldwide approach of Chinese aid. It also showed that while Sub-Saharan Africa is by far the region receiving the most aid in terms of aid projects, in the last decade Latin America and the Caribbean has seen its share sharply rise in terms of amount of aid allocated, passing from less than 5% to 20% of total Chinese aid budget. The third section assessed three main group of motives which may drive China to provide aid: though the need of the recipient and the institutional characteristics of the beneficiary are not relevant, political motives such the recognition of Taiwan may have an effect; furthermore, Chinese aid is openly directed to benefit the economic and commercial interests of the donor country, especially regarding its energy and raw material needs. In fact, privileging a South-South cooperation approach (which diverges from the classical humanitarian model of aid), Chinese official policy is formally described as a win-win approach: on the one hand China strongly needs big amounts of oil and raw materials for its energy and production needs; on the other hand, LAC need a buyer for their abundant natural resources, and they also need Chinese foreign aid and investments for their development goals. Finally, the fourth section consisted in an appraisal of the potential benefits and negative impacts of the Sino-LAC relationship, finding among potential concerns the unconditionality of Chinese foreign aid and its unbalanced trade relationship with the region. In light of the strategic and economic comprehensive analysis of Chinese unconditional aid and bilateral trade to Latin America and the Caribbean, we may conclude that China certainly provides short and medium term growth to the region, but it is more difficult to talk of a long term sustainable advancement, unless LAC governments succeed in diversifying their economies, avoiding exposing themselves to drops in the price of natural resources. Undoubtedly China will be a long-lasting ally to the region and partnerships with China are not to fear; however, there is a relatively high possibility of difficult times ahead, and LAC governments need to take steps to be prepared beforehand.

References

Alesina, A., & Dollar, D. (2000). Who gives foreign aid to whom and why? Journal of economic growth, 5(1), 33-63.

Alden, C. (2007). China in Africa: Partner, Competitor or Hegemon? (African Arguments). International African Institute, Royal African Society and Social Science Research Council.

Bartke, W. (1989). The Economic Aid of the PR China to Developing and Socialist Countries, 2d ed. Munich: K. G. Saur.

Bermeo, S. B. (2011). Foreign aid and regime change: a role for donor intent. World Development, 39(11), 2021-2031.

Brautigam, D. (2008). China’s African Aid: Transatlantic Challenges, Washington, DC: The German Marshall Fund of the United States.

Brautigam, D. (2009). The dragon’s gift: the real story of China in Africa. Oxford University Press.

Busse, M., & Groening, S. (2010). Does Foreign Aid Improve Governance?

CEPAL (2011). People’s Republic of China and Latin America and the Caribbean. Ushering in a new era in the economic and trade relationship. Santiago de Chile: CEPAL, November.

CEPAL, N. (2015). Latin America and the Caribbean and China: towards a new era in economic cooperation. Available at: http://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/38197/1/S1500388_en.pdf (accessed July 2017)

Curran, J. (2016). China to the Rescue? Implications of Chinese Aid and Trade in Latin America Based on Evidence from Sino-African Cases.

Davies, P. (2007). China and the End of Poverty in Africa – towards Mutual Benefit? Diakonia, Alfaprint, Sundyberg, Sweden.

De la Torre, A., Didier, T., Calderón, C., Cordella, T., & Pienknagura, S. (2011). Latin America and the Caribbean’s Long-Term Growth: Made in China? Washington: World Bank.

Devlin, R., Estevadeordal, A., & Rodríguez-Clare, A. (2006). The Emergence of china: Opportunities and challenges for latin america and the caribbean. IDB.

Dowsett, S., & Chen, A. (2010). China’s Sinopec buys Repsol Brazil stake for $7.1 billion. Reuters, Oct 1, 2010. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-repsol-sinopec-idUSTRE6900YZ20101001 (accessed June 2017)

Dreher, A., & Fuchs, A. (2012). Rogue aid? The determinants of China’s aid allocation.

Ellis, R. E. (2009). China in Latin America: the whats and wherefores (Vol. ٤٦). Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Gallagher, K. P., & Myers, M. (2016). China-Latin America Finance Database. Washington: Inter-American Dialogue.

Gallagher, K., & Porzecanski, R. (2008). China matters: China’s economic impact in Latin America. Latin American Research Review, 43(1), 185-200.

Gallagher, K., & Porzecanski, R. (2010). The dragon in the room: China and the future of Latin American industrialization. Stanford university press.

Gallagher, K. P., Irwin, A., & Koleski, K. (2012). The New Banks in Town: Chinese Finance in Latin America. Inter-American Dialogue. Working Paper.

Gupta, S., Pattillo, C., and Wagh, S. (2006). Are Donor Countries Giving More or Less Aid? Review of Development Economics 10, 3: pp. 535-552.

Isopi, A., & Mattesini, F. (2010, March). Aid and corruption: Do donors use development assistance to provide the “right” incentives. In AidData Conference, University College, Oxford, March (pp. ٢٢-٢٥).

Halper, S. (2010), The Beijing Consensus: How China’s Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the Twenty-first Century, New York: Basic Books.

Hawkins, D., Nielson, D., Bergevin, A., Hearn, A., & Perry, B. (2010). Codebook for Assembling Data on China’s Development Finance.

Hakim, P., & Myers, M. (2014). China and Latin America in 2013. China Policy Review.

Hearn, A. H., & León-Manríquez, J. L. (Eds.). (2011). China engages Latin America: tracing the trajectory. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Kaplinsky, R., McCormick, D., & Morris, M. (2007). The impact of China on sub-Saharan Africa.

Knack, S. (2004). Does foreign aid promote democracy? International Studies Quarterly, 48(1), 251-266.

Krauss C, & Bradsher, K. (2015, July 24). China’s Global Ambitions, with Loans and Strings Attached, The New York Times. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/26/business/international/chinas-global-ambitions-with-loans-and-strings-attached.html (last accessed on June 2017).

Kobayashi, T. (2008). Evolution of China’s Aid Policy, JBICI Working Paper 27, Japan Bank for International Cooperation.

Lancaster, C. (2007). The Chinese Aid System, Center for Global Development, Essay 33.

Leiteritz, R. J. (2012). China and Latin America: a marriage made in heaven?. Colombia internacional, (75), 49-81.

Lum, T. (2009, November). China’s assistance and government-sponsored investment activities in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia. Library Of Congress Washington Dc Congressional Research Service.

Ministry of Commerce (1984-2001). Almanac of China’s Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, Hong Kong: China Foreign Economic Relations and Trade Publishing House.

Ministry of Commerce (2004-2009), China Commerce Yearbook, Beijing: China Commerce and Trade Press.

Ministry of foreign affairs (2008). China’s policy paper on Latin America and the Caribbean. Available at http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2008-11/05/content_1140347.htm (last accessed on June 2017).

Naím, M. (2007). Rogue Aid, Foreign Policy 159, March/April: 95-96

OECD (1987). The Aid Programme of China. OECD, Paris.

Öhler, H., Nunnenkamp, P., & Dreher, A. (2012). Does conditionality work? A test for an innovative US aid scheme. European Economic Review, 56(1), 138-153.

Pehnelt, G. (2007). The political economy of China’s aid policy in Africa. Jena Economic Research Paper, (2007-051).

Rich, T. S. (2009). Status for Sale: Taiwan and the Competition for Diplomatic Recognition, Issues & Studies 45, 4: 159-188.

Roett, R., & Paz, G. (Eds.). (2008). China’s expansion into the western hemisphere: Implications for Latin America and the United States. Brookings Institution Press.

Sanderson, H., & Forsythe, M. (2012). China’s superbank: debt, oil and influence-how China Development Bank is rewriting the rules of finance. John Wiley & Sons.

Schüller, M., Brod, M., Neff D. & Marco Bünte (2010). China’s Emergence within Southeast Asia’s Aid Architecture: New Kid on the Block? Paper presented at the AidData Conference, University College, Oxford, March 22-25.

Shinn, D. (2006). Africa, China and health care. Inside AISA, 3(4), 15.

Smith, P. H., Horisaka, K., & Nishijima, S. (2003). East Asia and Latin America: the unlikely alliance. Rowman & Littlefield.

State Council (2011). White Paper on China’s Foreign Aid, Xinhua/China’s Information Office of the State Council, available at http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2011-04/21/content_1849913.htm (accessed June 2017).

State Council (2014). China’s Foreign Aid, Beijing/China’s Information Office of the State Council, available at

http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7209074.htm (accessed June 2017).

Sun, Y. (2014). China’s Aid to Africa: Monster or Messiah? The Brookings Institution, February 7, 2014, available at http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/02/07-china-aid-to-africa-sun (accessed June 2017).

Taylor, I. (2007). China and Africa: engagement and compromise (Vol. ١٠). Routledge.

Taylor, I. (2009). China’s new role in Africa. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Toro, A. (2013). The world turned upside down: the complex partnership between China and Latin America (Vol. ٣٤). World Scientific.

Tull, D. M. (2006). China’s Engagement in Africa: Scope, Significance and Consequences, Journal of Modern African Studies 44, 3: 459-479.
Villanger,

Watson, K. (2015), What will China’s investment do for Latin America? BBC News, July 7, 2015.