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Vergara Muñoz, F. A. (2022). Autonomy/Independence of the Central Bank as a Neoliberal Symptom Edge. Revista Guillermo De Ockham, 20(2). https://doi.org/10.21500/22563202.5890 (Original work published July 29, 2022)
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Abstract

This article seeks to review and question the neutrality of the "Central Bank autonomy" concept. First, a historical contextualization will be made regarding autonomy, where it will be shown that even the theoretical support that fundaments it is logically inconsistent, while hiding the political element that exists behind it. Then, based on the above and in accordance with the readings offered by Ruiz Encina and Harvey, it will be shown how the conceptualization of the autonomy of monetary policy actually responds to a clear neoliberal position, while it will be shown that there are strong discrepancies between the technocratic discourse of autonomy and the real effects that can be seen in its historical sequence, emphasizing specially on inflation. In a second part, through the theoretical elaborations carried out by García Linera, this positioning will be understood as a specific edge that occurs within the general process of fetishization of the common. Finally, using categories from Žižek and Espinoza Lolas, the analysis will be framed to understand the autonomy of the Central Bank as a symptomatic expression of the ideological processes that underlie the form of the capitalist State.

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