

La interrelación de la democracia y el desarrollo económico. Una perspectiva breve para Colombia.

The intertwining of democracy and economic development. A brief insight for Colombia

David Caicedo Sarralde¹

Abstract:

The following article will attempt to provide an insight about the relationship between economic development and the democracy of a country. A brief State of the Art revision has been constructed in order to propose a theoretical underpinning for the discussion. In addition, this article includes an interview with Professor Matthew Carnes S.J., in order to enrich the discussion arguments. His answers make a positive contribution to the debate by displaying alternatives that address the issues of our current political system. During this article, several frameworks will be presented to establish the interconnections between the economic system and the performance of democracy, opening up the door for several authors such as Seymour Martin Lipset, James Robinson, Adam Przeworski, George Akerloff, Robert Shiller, Inglehart, Collier and others, which will be applied to the Colombian case.

1 economist and political scientist of the Pontifical Javeriana University. He is a Co-founder of the Political Economy Research Group of the Pontifical Javeriana University, the Sumak Kawsay Research Centre and The Fair Coffee and Sumak Kawsay alliance. His main publications have focused on the political economy of alternative development, inequality, land distribution and the Sumak Kawsay approach.

Resumen:

El siguiente artículo tratará de proveer un aporte sobre la relación entre el desarrollo económico y la democracia dentro de un país. Una breve revisión del estado del arte se ha construido para proponer un sustento teórico para la discusión. En adición, este artículo incluye una entrevista con el profesor Matthew Carnes S.J., con el objetivo de enriquecer los argumentos de la discusión. Sus respuestas se constituyen en una contribución positiva para el debate, en la medida en que evidencia las alternativas que abordan las problemáticas de nuestro sistema político actual. Durante este artículo, se presentarán marcos teóricos para establecer las interconexiones entre el sistema económico y el desempeño de la democracia, abriendo la discusión a autores como Seymour Martin Lipset, James Robinson, Adam Przeworski, George Akerloff, Robert Shiller, entre otros, que serán aplicados al caso colombiano.

Palabras clave:

Desarrollo económico, democracia, desigualdad, economías en desarrollo, correlación, relación causal, Colombia.

Key Words:

Economic Development, Democracy, inequality, developing economies, correlation, causal relationship, Colombia.

Article Classification – Colciencias:

6) Subject Review article

Introduction: The correlation and relationship between economic development and democracy

On the one hand, the first links between economic development and democracy were drawn as a causal relationship, proven by statistical correlations and a qualitative explanation mostly seen in so called developed countries. On the other hand, new authors have added new econometric methodologies to the statistical correlations, such as heterogeneous assumptions and case fixed effects. As a result, these new studies have rather underpinned the positive relationship between the two variables. However, they note that economic development should be accompanied with other variables and thereby cannot always derive into stable democracy.

Authors such as Seymour Martin Lipset (1959) categorized economic development firstly from a modernization perspective, by linking it with wealth and economic growth. This was evident as Lipset subdivided economic development into four variables: wealth, industrialization, urbanization and education (Diamond, 1992, p.3), from which was assumed that a higher level of wealth could reduce the overall inequality level (Thiebault, 2013). In addition, this hypothesis is related to Kuznet's U-shaped curve (1955) that displayed the relationship between per capita income and income inequality.

Furthermore, a link between several conditions of capital industrialization and modern democracies was established by Karl Marx, Max Weber and Barrington Moore (Arat, 1988). In other words, these authors identified an important role played by the interaction of the bourgeoisie and the middle classes in the development of modern democracies.

These views have been complemented by post-Marxist, and geographical approaches such as Uneven and combined development. In the case of Bresser-Pereira (2011), he displayed the four historical conditions, whereby universal suffrage was guaranteed and a democracy could never slip back into a non-democratic regime.

Other studies, have subsequently included more variables into the analysis, such as life expectancy, fertility rates, poverty and disparity of income. One of the conclusions is that democracies are much more fragile if they spring up in poor countries, as there is a poverty trap, however the political regimes do not have an impact “on growth of the total income when countries are observed across the entire spectrum of conditions” (Przeworski, 2004, p.21).

Finally, more econometric evidences to the relationship emerged when Idzalika and Martinez-Zarzoso (2017) assumed a heterogeneous variance of explanatory variables, in the case of economic development. Their results, showed a positive relationship to the extent that a rising income can be associated with a higher probably of becoming fully democratic.

Development and inequality in so called developing economies

In line with these ideas, Robinson (2006) explained that the casual effect between economic development and democracy was not yet clear, as the econometric evidence did not provide a conclusive result. In spite of the consensus on the correlation between the two variables, it was proven that more cross-country and depth-case studies was needed in order to understand the relationship (Acemoglu et al., 2008; Robinson & Acemoglu, 2008).

Hence, further studies (Acemoglu et al., 2015) showed that the theoretical underpinning of the reduction of inequality in a democracy could be hampered if it was captured by a richer segment of a population, which is a recurrent case in called developing economies. In addition, inequality tends to increase with factors such as a process of structural transformation, high land inequality, a small gap between the middle class and the poor.

New studies have proven that a higher level of economic development does not translate into the consolidation of a democracy. This conclusion was driven from an empirical demonstration of the increase in clientelist politics as countries moved from low to intermediate levels of both democracy and development (Kitschelt & Kselman, 2013, p.2).

If we add up this idea to the conclusion of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) from their book: *Why nations Fail*, then the dots could be connected between coopted institutions and vicious cycles, which obliterates the effect of economic development on the consolidation of a democracy. Heo (2015) also contributed with the factor of institution and democracy maturity, as an important condition in order to show that economic development and democracy affect each other.

It is useful to mention Gründler and Krieger's (2016) study which concluded that development does not necessarily lead to a higher level of distribution. In other words, by using Support Vector Machines and mathematical algorithms, the authors concluded that democratic countries may have good indicators for development but not necessarily for redistribution. This was analyzed for 185 countries.

Measurements of democracy

Democracy itself can be measured depending on the adopted approach. That is, whether the quality of the democracy is to be measured by the democratic culture, the determinants of a good democracy, a good governance, democratic institutions stability, or several others.

For the purpose of measuring the relationship between democracy and economic development, some author's measure democra-

cy by the years of democratic experience a country has had, along with income inequality and stability (Muller, 1988, pp.50-68). This in turns gives a positive correlation between low income inequality and years of democratic experience.

Other authors such as Rivera (2002), Abeyasingue (2004), Persson (2005), Rachdi and Saidi (2015), Heshmat and Kim (2017), have measured the variable of democracy through its link with economic growth. This in turn brings about the debate around the relationship between economic growth and economic development which can be addressed from many approaches.

From statistical studies, other authors have rather attempted measurements by using panel data extracted from large comparative databases where the measurement variable is whether the country is a democracy or not (Heshamt and Kim, 2017, pp.1-2) . Other study that drew on cross-sectional and panel data to compare the forms of democracy as a dichotomy concluded that there is a positive relationship between a democratic form and economic performance in the long run (Persson, 2005, p.3)

In terms of indicators, some authors have measured democracy by the quality of governance and its relationship to strong democratic institutions (Rivera, 2002, pp.10-13) for example. Others have created indicators such as “Institutionalized Democracy Score, Institutionalized Autocracy Score, Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment, Openness of Executive Recruitment (...)” (Rachdi and Saidi, 2015, p.2). In addition, a democracy may lead to political stability but is not a unique result of it, hence proving that sometimes a democracy may be lacking but political stability would be a factor driving economic growth (Abeyasingue, 2004, pp.7-8).

Having said that, concepts such as democratic governance have been used in order to further underpin the quality of the measurement. Scott et al (2011) have created a compound indicator to

measure the variable of democratic governance which includes nine dimensions: “the level of democracy, rule of law, corruption, economic growth, inflation, job creation, poverty, education, citizen security” (Scott et al, 2011, pp.33-34).

Democratic quality and performance have also been measured by compound indicators that contain variables such as: free and fair elections, openness and accountability of responsive government, civil and political rights and democratic society (Berg-Schlusser, 2004, p.14).

Inglehart (2003) provided a useful insight into this type of indicators by measuring “how strongly the individual-level responses to given survey items are linked with high (or low) levels of democracy (Inglehart, 2003, p.51). This highlighted the importance of public opinion’s perception as a determinant of a democracy.

For the particular example of latinamerican countries, the Latinobarometro has been a yearly published analysis of democratic quality and most importantly of the perceptions of the citizens towards their democracy which reveals several conditions that are particular to one country. (Latinobarometro, 2017)

The Latinobarometer reveals that in spite of living in democratic countries that have a certain degree of economic development, citizens of latinamerica display contradictions. For example, in 2017 only 30% of the average population in latinamerica said that they were satisfied with democracy. Yet, in countries like Venezuela, 78% said that democracy was preferable to different systems. (Latinobarómetro, 2017, p.9).

Here we can retrieve important indicators of the quality of democracy, as a variable that is measured by the citizen’s perception. This includes level of satisfaction with democracy, government approval, government trust, interpersonal trust, corruption and voting

valuation (Latinobarómetro, 2017, pp.24-40). This is underpinned by Inglehart's link between interpersonal trust and the stability of a democracy (Inglehart, 1999, p.88)

This gives sense to concepts like the Churchillian notion of democracy, which states that democracy is a flawed system but still the best government system. This in turn is contrasted with the citizen's perception of the economy, understood by variables such as subjective income, sufficient food, unemployment risk, social protection, economic progress perception and economic expectancies. The conclusion is that the perception of the quality of democracy and economic development are intertwined for the citizen's opinion.

As a complementary measure of democracy and economic development through citizen's perception, the National Democratic Institute (2005) also formulated indicators that consisted of 11 variables that link the two concepts: "Civil rights, economic and social rights, civil and political participation, political parties, free and fair elections, rule of law, military and police control, government accountability, corruption, media and government responsiveness" (O'Day, 2005, pp.1-2).

These two examples of compound indicators that are based on citizen's perception have proven that for the case of latinamerican countries and so called developing economies, the link between democracy and economic development is not inherently positive.

This would provide an additional insight into Olson's thesis about the importance of a democracy vis-à-vis autocracies (Olson, 2013), as it can empirically proven that bad economic performance is only a problem of autocracies but also of democracies. In turn this would also provide a support for Collier's thesis that links resource-rich countries with open democracies that lack effective check and balance schemes, hamper economic performance (Collier, 2008). In addition, democracies that have a certain income threshold may be

prone to political violence which in turn hampers economic development (Collier, 2010, p.24).

The development debate and economic performance

According to some authors, it is granted that “development requires sustained increases in income (...)” (Mobarak, 2006, p.2), which ties a link between economic growth and economic development. This link has been however questioned by several studies including as we have seen by Gründler and Krieger. Professor Carnes (2018) also provides an insight to this by explaining that economic growth does not necessarily lead to an equitable distribution and thus to a higher economic development.

Both visions about the relationship are underpinned by the conception of development that is adopted, which may or may not include variables such as economic distribution, economic satisfaction, economic perception, social welfare and many others. Thus, the concept of debate is rather a category subject to debate rather than an empirically defined concept. Among other approaches, it can be considered as political economy debate.

Following Uribe’s review on development models, economic theory changes have provided the main base that defined the first conceptions of development. For example, classical economic theory underpinned by Smith, Ricardo, Malthus, Say and Marx provided an explanation for economic wealth, natural resources, value, distribution and capital. (Uribe, 2008, pp.28-49).

On these grounds, development was split mainly into two pathways. Development as seen in the eyes of the modernization values or development as seen by the values of change theory and revolutions.

In the vision of Inglehart (2005) modernization consolidated several values to the concept of development whose change through time led to the integration of concepts such as trust and GDP measures (Inglehart, 2005, p.48). Kuznet's measure of GDP supports this conception, establishing a link between economic growth and economic development.

The questions about distribution were included in the concept of development gradually as Keynes macroeconomic theory, along with the Welfare State policies took place in the decades of 1950 and 1960. After the decade of 1980, neoclassical economics based on the optimization models such as the Walrasian equilibrium and Pareto's optimality, brought back a debate between distribution and efficiency. (Uribe, 2008, pp.70-97). The international Financial Institutions, The Bretton woods agreement and Milton Friedman's monetarists further underpinned the theoretical grounds of this conception that defined development in terms of economic and monetary efficiency.

The Human Development Index was built thereby as a complement and not questioning of these assumptions, as the GDP was still considered as a determinant of the index. Thereby mathematically speaking, a positive relationship between economic growth and human development could be drawn.

Subsequently different conceptions of development were developed based on new approaches more linked to the postmodern era, such as post-structuralism or poscolonialism. The concepts of ideological domination (Sousa Santos, 2010) were introduced and the cultural values of modernization that were attached to development were questioned.

The concept of development is thus nurtured by new variables that take into account the cultural values of the assumptions underlying economic theories. Hence a new conception of develo-

ment is proposed by these theories, as the concept of self-development and self-knowledge is introduced as opposed to modernization and globalized economic efficiency values.

Furthermore, approaches such as ecological economics or green economics, have engaged in the orthodox economic theory debate by introducing terms such as the Steady State Economy, climate change, the ecosystem and energy cycle. ()

These have started to question the notion of sustainable development as seen in the Bruntland commission (Boudling, 1969, pp.1-12). and further conferences including Rio+10 and Rio+20 that have not yet abandoned the notion of development as tantamount to economic growth The steady state economy is proposed as a mechanism to reduce the throughput rate of the economy and even establishing a zero growth goal in order to attain the desired level of development (Daly, 2012).

This has led to several heterodox approaches such as ecosocialism, ecofeminism, ecological Marxism, among several others than offer themselves a different view of development that releases several assumptions from neoclassical economics.

Most importantly, concepts such as degrowth have nurtured the notion of self-development, as it defines development as a pathway of reducing economic growth to attain sustainable development (Kallis et al, 2012, pp.5-8). In compliment, approaches such as the Economics of happiness have modified the most basic neoclassical underpinnings based on the utilitarian theory (Lee Graham, 2005; Inglehart and Klingemann, 2003, p.166).

Finally, local conceptions of development that foster traditional and ancestral values offer a completely different worldvision that entails new definitions of development. Such examples may be found in conceptions such as Sumak Kawsay, Suma Qumaña, Alli Kawsay

and several others. These offer a conception of development based on three pillars: Mother Nature, the Human Being and the Community. Economic growth is not seen as a pillar and its relationship is obliterated.

Both Orthodox and Heterodox conceptions of development, based either on new economic theories, cultural challenges, self-development conceptions and local worldvisions spell out the need to challenge the conception of development as one single definition.

In sum, economic development can be addressed from different approaches and worldviews that entail the entrance of new variables and elements into the relationship with economic growth. Some even propose a negative relationship based on new theoretical economic underpinnings. As the concept of development is presented as a debate, it must be adjusted accordingly given the methodologies of measurement and the approaches that best describe the desired situations.

Further Challenges to the relationship between the two variables

There have more challenges to the relationship, both from orthodox and heterodox approaches, from quantitative and qualitative perspectives and from theoretical and empirical grounds. Although, it is important to note that economic development proposes a debate in itself, which still leads to a structural discussion of the definition and inclusiveness of the term.

Firstly, some statistical challenges to the relationship of the variables, were underpinned by the comparison between cross-sectional and longitudinal data. Their argument was that the positive correlation could not be confirmed with longitudinal data. However, this was not contradictory to Lipset's conclusion, as he stated that

economic development was a necessary but not sufficient condition for democracy (Arat, p.15). Yet all the multivariable analysis, still identified economic development as a relevant determinant of a democracy.

Secondly, several cases have been pointed out by historical approaches between the 1990s and the 2000s, where democratic breakdowns were used to prove the faults in the relationship by certain political scientists (Thiebault, 2013, p.3). In the case of developing economies, authors such as O'donnell (2013) demonstrated that a higher level of economic development, promoted bureaucratic authoritarian dictatorships in the case of Latin America, instead of democracies. For example, in the case of countries like Chile, economic development did not lead directly to the replacement of the dictatorship.

Moreover, Rustow(1970) argued that democracies had existed at low levels of economic development, pointing out many cases like the United States in 1820 or France in 1870. In contrast he concluded that the necessary conditions for a democracy to take place were a national unity sense and elite commitment towards democratic transition (Thiebault, 2013, p.3).

In addition, several exceptions have been found by social scientists, when analyzing increases in economic development levels in countries like China, Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, and others. The argument here is that higher levels of income and even lower levels of inequality have not been translated into a better performance of a democracy.

These last arguments, provide a useful element into the discussion of our current political system, as Colombia has a political structure that resembles the elements described by O'Donnell, Robinson and Rustow. That is, a very high land inequality, a history of political clientelism and cooptation of the State by the elites or the

wealthy privileged (Rao, 1985), and a rather ambiguous sense of national union (Bushnell, 1993).

If we combine these elements with the current political outcomes, seen both in the congress elections of the 11th of March of 2018 and the presidential elections of the 27th of May of 2018, we might be able to extract a preliminary pattern. In other words, having trivialized certain effects, we could get that as only 50% of the population voted (Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil, 2018), the patterns of political culture, abstentionism, political activism, public opinion and electoral strategies have a close relationship to the distribution of income and the political history of the regions.

The current level of inequality measured by the income GINI coefficient is 50.8 (World Bank , 2016), however we can add the indicators of HDI, Multidimensional Poverty and the Unsatisfied Basic Needs, which have a values of 0.727 (United Nations Development Program, 2016) , 0.17 (Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística, 2017) and 0.27 (Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística, 2005)respectively. If we apply the theoretical framework of Robinson, Bresser-Pereira and Carnes, we may be able to draw a connection between the high levels of inequality and poverty with the indicators of the performance of the Colombian democracy. In this case, Professor Carnes S.J. provided a magisterial interview that further explains the relationship of the variables in the Colombian case.

Interview with Professor Carnes, S.J.

Reverend Matthew Carnes Ph.D. is an associate professor at the Department of Government and the Walsh School of Foreign Service of the University of Georgetown, and has been the director of the Center for Latin American Studies since 2016. His main research has focused on labor and social welfare policies in middle-

income countries and developing economies (Georgetown University Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs, 2018; Google Sites, 2018) and the political economy of distribution (Stanford University Hoover institution, 2018).

His research has appeared in more than 10 journals including the publication of a book in 2014 called *The Politics of Labor Regulation in Latin America* (2014). In his book, he thoroughly analyzed the Latin America's labor laws, resilient institutions and reforms from statistical and theoretical grounds, demonstrating that there were few changes between the 1980s and 1990s from past laws. Although his work was based on the case studies of Chile, Argentina and Peru, the lessons of the book may as well be applied to Colombia in terms of the pervasiveness of long-term economic boundaries.

That said, Professor Carnes S.J, has received several prizes for his outstanding education and is recognized worldwide for his academic contributions. Thus, he was invited to give a presentation in March of 2018 at the International Permanent Forum for Anti-Corruption studies of the Pontifical Javeriana University. During the forum, I interviewed Professor Carnes, who very kindly lend me some minutes of his time to share his valuable experience and insight. The interview has been posted below:

Beginning of the Interview

Professor Carnes, thank you for your presentation. Would you be kind enough to give me a few minutes of your time to answer two questions of an interview for a research I am conducting?

Hi David. Nice to meet you. Sure, go ahead.

Can I record you?

Sure.

Based on your explanations and given what's happening in the global political system, as we have individuals like trump in the head of the Political System of the U.S., or in the case of Colombia where 50% or 60% of the population doesn't vote, should we aim to create a new political system? Are these people sending a bigger message about the crisis of our political systems? On other words, should we be striving for new ways of doing politics or can we address these issues within the boundaries of our current political systems?

Excellent question, I would answer this by thinking about the way that our political system is intertwined with the economic system. The political system in and of itself may be problematic, but perhaps even greater has been the outcome of the economic system we've had. And so, the economic system we have, as I mentioned, created incredible growth. I mean, about capitalism, it is actually hard to say that any other system has done better in terms of growth. However, it has not done well on distribution. So that means a lots of people are excluded and that becomes a problem for democracy when excluded people say, I lost out economically, why would I vote, why would I participate, why would I be investing.

Democracy needs to find democratic structures that better represent underrepresented voices that better think about distributional questions. In other words, how we take resources, which we actually have, as we say in English, a bigger pie, "Pastel más grande", and divide them. But we need to divide them in a way that allows for better inclusion so that the rich can still do well but not necessarily super well. So, how can we find a way to address this? Unfortunately, democracy has shown itself fairly poor at coming up with those solutions. Now, I am not convinced that dictatorship or oligarchy does a better job on those fronts. So I would stick with democracy. But say, we need to really think about how we address

this and in some ways, encourage those who are in elite positions, whether elected or because of their economic power, to see it in their own best interest to also invest in the common good. One thing I am very concerned about is that, especially in Latin America and in middle income countries, there is always an exit option for the rich. In Latin America it's called Miami. Those who are rich, if they don't want to invest at home, just go to Miami and they can skip from these things. I think giving them more of a sense, I'm not sure exactly how you do this, but a sense of being invested in the whole community, then gives them responsibility to say: How do I distribute some of what I have, in terms of jobs, opportunity, education, these sort of things, that then can create more inclusive society and then, I think, reinforce the democracy that's more vibrant.

As you mentioned the intertwining between the economic and the political system, Seymour Martin Lipset comes to mind, in terms of the line between democracy and economic development, and also Akerloff and Shiller's (2016) book on the economics of manipulation, ¿Do you reckon that an intertwining between the economic and the political system, can help us tackle this corruption or manipulation of the system, as well as solve the political boundaries that have been set by the bad incentives provided the economic system that provides growth, but at the same time has inequality as something somehow inherent to the system?

It's a wonderful question. I have a little piece called "political science and the common good". If you look on my website, it might be helpful for this. One thing that is important is to think about what most of our societies did with their constitutions: They took seriously the rational turn of economics. We basically figured people are self-interested and that we need checks and balances to limit their self-interest. But the thing we didn't understand, and this is where Akerloff and Shiller are so important, is the behavioral turn

and the behavioral side of economics that has lately shown us that people are not always rational. They don't always pursue their own self-interest, as they sometimes misperceive benefits and loses. And we actually need to think about that more robustly. I don't have a clear solution on how you do that but I do think being more aware of it, allows us to think about how can we build in incentives. The incentives can't simply be: if I hand you 10 dollars, you feel that differently than if you have to give me 10 dollars. We know that from behavioral economics. Right now we treat in democracy 10 dollars always the same.

How do we create a system where we actually think about the ways in which people feel about these incentives, and the ways they react to them? That's going to be one of the next turns. Even, creating default mechanisms by which it is easier for people to vote, easier to participate, instead of requiring as it is in the United States, for people to register in order to vote. You know, if there is a way where we are automatically enrolled to vote, it can increase people's turnout. I think it could be very interesting if you think about some of those nudges and fixes. This would be one of the keys of the system. The one thing I would say is: nudges and fixes, whatever we do, we don't want them to undermine the free choice of the individuals. So you still want people in democracy to make their own decisions, but to figure out if there are now ways in which we can nudge them to make a decision, that I think could be very positive.

I entirely agree with that, Thank you very much for your time.

Thank you. It was nice to meet you

End of the interview

Conclusions

Since 1959, the year when Lipset published his research on the relationship between economic development and democracy, the two variables have been analyzed from several perspectives and approaches. Some of the methodologies applied include statistical and econometrical comparisons, cross-country analysis, in-depth case studies and empirical findings in contrast to theoretical frameworks.

The relationship between the two variables, has been nurtured by new findings insofar as new tools and authors have contributed to the discussion. Firstly, modernization theory provided a first framework of analysis, through Lipset and Kuznet's work by associating the level of income of a country with the stability of a democracy and reduction of inequality, by comparing two groups of countries. Secondly, Marxist and post-Marxist authors displayed the importance of capitalist dynamics such as class relationships in the development of modern democracies. And thirdly, Pzeworska and neo-institutional approaches such as Acemoglu and Robinson's added new variables to the discussions, giving way for econometric approaches that further supported a positive correlation for a cross-country analysis.

However, historical approaches and in-depth case studies have proven several exceptions to the relationship, hence making the causal link more ambiguous. In addition, econometric longitudinal data have provided exceptions to the correlation. Finally, authors such as O'Donnell and Robinson, who have studied developing nations noted several factors such as the existence of clientelist politics and the cooption of the State by the elite that obliterate the relationship in developing economies.

The determinants of democracy have been also linked to concepts such as democratic governance and the citizen's perception of democracy. These past variables have shown new insights that display a disparity between the perception of democracy and its

actual performance including a relationship with economic performance. In addition, the theoretical debate around the concept of development shows that there are several approaches, worldviews and methodologies that bring about different variables that make it harder to establish a positive relationship between economic growth and economic development.

Finally, in the case of Colombia, based on Professor Carne's interview and application of the frameworks to the current situation of the political system, several questions can be brought up in order to provide a line of argument for the discussion: How can we address the current level of income inequality in Colombia, from a democracy that has not been fully developed and that is probably deepening inequality by its own practices? Which mechanisms can our society adopt, in order to change the behavioral patterns that shape both political participation and economic development in our country? Is it possible to find an alternative to the discussion, by problematizing the concept of development in itself, as there are other approaches in Latin America such as Sumak Kawsay that give a different definition of development? Or should we try to find a new intertwining between alternative approaches of development with the ones that several authors have employed in this article? The more questions we ask about our methods and our own findings, as Karl Popper and Hegel once affirmed, the closer we may get to the understanding of the phenomenon as a whole. In this sense, conceptions such as the Sumak Kawsay and self-development provide elements in order to nurture the discussion and include new approaches to understand each particular case.

Bibliography:

Abeyashinge, R. (2004). Democracy, Political Stability, and Developing Country Growth: Theory and Evidence. *Honos projects*. Obtenido de https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=econ_honproj

- Acemoglu, D. a. (2008). Income and democracy. *American Economic Review*, 98(3), 808-842. doi:10.1257/aer.98.3.808
- Acemoglu, D. e. (2015). Democracy, redistribution, and inequality. *Handbook of Income Distribution*, 2, 1885-1966. doi:10.1016/B978-0-444-59429-7.00022-4
- Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. (2012). *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty*.
- Akerlof, G., & Shiller, R. (2016). *Phishing for Phools: The Economics of Manipulation and Deception*. U.S.: Princeton University Press .
- Arat, Z. F. (1988). Democracy and Economic Development: Modernization Theory Revisited. *Journal of Comparative Politics*, 22(1), 21-36. doi:10.2307/422069
- Bergh-Schlosser, D. (2004). Indicators of Democracy and Good Governance as Measures of the Quality of Democracy in Africa: A Critical Appraisal. *Acta Politica*, 39(3), 248-278 . Obtenido de https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233692575_Indicators_of_Democracy_and_Good_Governance_as_Measures_of_the_Quality_of_Democracy_in_Africa_A_Critical_Appraisal
- Boulding, K. (2015). Economics as a Moral Science. *The American Economic Review*, 59(1), 1-12. Obtenido de https://en-econ.tau.ac.il/sites/economy_en.tau.ac.il/files/media_server/Economics/grad/mini%20courses/David%20Colander/Boulding.pdf
- Bresser-Pereira, L. (2011). Democratic transition, consolidation and capitalist revolution. *Open Access Journal*, 54(2), 223-258. Obtenido de <https://www.scopus-com.ezproxy.javeriana.edu.co/record/display.uri?eid=2-s2.0-80955135667&origin=resultslis t&sort=plf-f&src=s&sid=c8992def3c1950e7eb08573a114cb5fc&sot=b&sdt=cl &cluster=scoprefnameuid%2c%22Bresser-Pereira%2c+L.C.%236602645923%22 %2ct&sl=87&>
- Bushnell, D. (1993). *The Making of Modern Colombia: A Nation in Spite of Itself*. University of California Press.
- Carnes, M. (2014). *Continuity Despite Change. The Politics of Labor Regulation in Latin America*. Stanford University Press.
- Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2008). Testing the neocon agenda: Democracy in resource-rich societies. *European Economic Review*, 53(3), 293-308. Obtenido de <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014292108000548>

- Collier, P., & Rohner, D. (2010). DEMOCRACY, DEVELOPMENT, AND CONFLICT. *Journal of the European Economics Association*, 6(2), 531-540. Obtenido de <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1162/JEEA.2008.6.2-3.531>
- Corporación Latinobarometro. (2017). *Informe 2017*. Santiago de Chile.
- Daly, H. (2008). *A Steady-State Economy*. Sustainable development Commission.
- Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística. (2005). *COLOMBIA. Necesidades Básicas Insatisfechas - NBI, por total, cabecera y resto, según departamento y nacional*. Bogotá: DANE.
- Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística. (2017). *Pobreza Monetaria y Multidimensional en Colombia 2017*. Obtenido de <https://www.dane.gov.co/index.php/estadisticas-por-tema/pobreza-y-condiciones-de-vida/pobreza-y-desigualdad/pobreza-monetaria-y-multidimensional-en-colombia-2017>
- Diamond, L. (1992). Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered. *Hoover Institution, Stanford University*, 35(4-5), 450-499. doi:<https://doi.org/10.1177/000276429203500407>
- Georgetown University Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs. (2018). *People - Mathew Carnes*. Obtenido de <https://berkeleycenter.georgetown.edu/people/matthew-carnes>
- Google Sites. (2018). *Georgetown Mathew Carnes, S.J.* Obtenido de <https://sites.google.com/a/georgetown.edu/mec247/home>
- Gründler, K., & Krieger, T. (2016). Democracy and growth: Evidence from a machine learning indicator. *European Journal of Political Economy*(45), 85-107. Obtenido de <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268016300222>
- Heo, U., & Hahm, S. (2015). (Article). *Social Science Quarterly*, 96(4), 1041-1058. doi:10.1111/ssqu.12185
- Heshmati, A., & Kim, N.-S. (2017). The Relationship between Economic Growth and Democracy: Alternative Representations of Technological Change. *Institute of Labour Economics*. Obtenido de <http://ftp.iza.org/dp10880.pdf>
- Idzalika, R., Kneib, T., & Martinez-Zarzoso, I. (2017). The effect of income on democracy revisited a flexible distributional approach. *Empirical Economics*, 1-24. doi:10.1007/s00181-017-1390-7

- Inglehart, R. (1999). Trust, Wellbeing and democracy. En M. Warren, *Democracy and Trust* (págs. 88-104). Cambridge University Press.
- Inglehart, R. (2003). How Solid is Mass Support for Democracy—And How Can We Measure It? *Political Science and Politics*, 36(1), 51-57. Obtenido de <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/ps-political-science-and-politics/article/how-solid-is-mass-support-for-democracyand-how-can-we-measure-it/E0DEBC765B19B72F29C03FA9A9D99A47#fndtn-information>
- Inglehart, R., & Klingeman, H.-D. (2003). Genes, Culture, Democracy and Happiness. En E. Diener, & E. Suh, *Culture and Subjective Well-being*. MIT Press.
- Inglehart, R., & Welzel, C. (2005). *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence*. U.S.: Cambridge University Press.
- Inglehart, R., & Welzel, C. (2009). How Development Leads to Democracy: What We Know About Modernization. *Foreign Affairs*, 88(2), 33-48 . Obtenido de https://www.jstor.org/stable/20699492?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
- Kallis, G., Kershner, C., & Alier, J. M. (2012). The economics of degrowth. *Ecological economics*, 1-9.
- Kitschelt, H., & Kselman, D. (2013). Economic Development, Democratic Experience, and Political Parties' Linkage Strategies. *Comparative Political Studies*, 46(11), 1453-1484. doi:10.1177/0010414012453450
- Kuznets, S. (1955). Economic growth and income inequality. *American Economic Review*, 45(1), 1–28.
- Lee Graham, C. (2005). The Economics of Happiness. 6(3), 41-63. Obtenido de https://www.researchgate.net/publication/237809673_The_Economics_of_Happiness
- Lipset, S. M. (1959). Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy. *The American Political Science Review*, 53(1), 69-105. doi:<https://doi.org/10.2307/1951731>
- Mainwaring, S., Scully, T., & Vargas-Cullell, J. (2011). Measuring Success in Democratic Governance. *Revista Latinoamericana de política comparada*, 5. Obtenido de <http://repositorio.flacsoandes.edu.ec/bitstream/10469/14167/1/REXTN-RLPC05-02-Mainwaring.pdf>

- Mobarak, A. (2006). Democracy, Volatility, and Economic Development. *Review of economics and statistics*, 87(2), 348-361. Obtenido de <https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/0034653053970302>
- Muller, E. (1988). Democracy, Economic Development, and Income Inequality. *American Sociological Review*, 53(1), 50-68. Obtenido de https://www.jstor.org/stable/2095732?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
- O'Day, J. B. (2007). *Democracy indicators*. National Democratic Institute.
- O'Donnell, G. (1973). Modernization and Bureaucratic-authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics. *Institute of International Studies, University of California*(6).
- Olson, M. (2013). Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development. *American Political Science Association*, 87(3), 567-576. Obtenido de <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/dictatorship-democracy-and-development/2776079374BF1E318DF928EA79EF2294>
- Persson, T. (2005). Forms of Democracy, Policy and Economic Development. *National Bureau of Economic Research*. Obtenido de <https://www.nber.org/papers/w11171.pdf>
- Przeworski, A. (2004). Democracy and Economic Development. En E. Mansfield, *Political Science and the Public Interest* (págs. 1-27). Columbus, Ohio, U.S.: Ohio State University Press. Obtenido de <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/2675/792b4b3806af246ba811c9bdfdc13c3525a1.pdf>
- Rachdi, H., & Hichem, S. (2015). Democracy and Economic Growth: Evidence in MENA Countries. *Procedia- Social and behavioral sciences*, 191, 616-621. Obtenido de <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1877042815029110>
- Rao, V. (1985). Democracy and economic development. *Stud Comp Int Dev*, 19(4), 67-81.
- Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil. (2018). *Elección de Presidente - Segunda Vuelta 2018*. Obtenido de <https://publicacion2.procesoselectorales.com/>
- Rivera, F. (2002). DEMOCRACY, GOVERNANCE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: Theory and Evidence. *Review of Development Economics*, 6(2), 225-247. Obtenido de http://www.columbia.edu/~flr9/documents/Rivera-Batiz_Democracy_Governance_Growth.pdf
- Robinson, J. (2006). Economic development and democracy. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 9, 503-527. Obtenido de <https://www.scopus-com.ezproxy.javeriana.edu.co/record/display.uri?eid=2-s2.0-33745778490&origin=resultslist&sort=plf-f&src>

=s&sid=3686c6fd09ea4d3b0191ec187f4c267e&sot=b&sdt=cl&cluster=scopref
nameuid%2c%22Robinson%2c+J.A.%2318434966300%22%2ct&sl=87&s=TITL

Robinson, J., & Acemoglu, D. (19 de June de 2008). Paths of Economic and Political Development. En *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy* (págs. 1-1112). Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548477.003.0037

Rustow, D. (1970). Transitions to Democracy: Toward A Dynamic Model. *Comparative Politics*, 2, 337-363.

Scott Et Al, .. (2011). Measuring Success in Democratic Governance. *Revista Latinoamericana de Política Comparada*, 5, 31-66. Obtenido de <http://repositorio.flacsoandes.edu.ec/handle/10469/14167>

Sousa Santos, B. (2010). *Descolonizar el saber, reinventar el poder*. Montevideo, Uruguay: Trilce.

Stanford University Hoover Institution. (2018). *Fellows - Mathew Carnes*. Obtenido de <https://www.hoover.org/profiles/matthew-carnes>

Thiebault, J.-L. (2013). The economic development as factor of democracy. *FGV EBAPE journal*, 1-17. Obtenido de <https://ebape.fgv.br/sites/ebape.fgv.br/files/the-economic-development-as-factor-of-democracy.pdf>

United Nations Development Program. (2016). *Human Development Reports*. Obtenido de <http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/COL>

Uribe, C. (2008). *Un modelo para armar. Teorías y conceptos de desarrollo*. Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica de Peru.

World Bank . (2016). *GINI index (World Bank estimate)*. Obtenido de <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI>