PDF (Español (España))
FLIP
XML (Español (España))
This journal provides immediate open access to its content, based on the principle that giving the public free access to research helps a greater global exchange of knowledge.
Therefore, the Creative Commons 4.0 Attribution Attribution - Equal Share (by-sa) License is accepted: The commercial use of the work and the possible derived works is permitted, the distribution of which must be done with a license equal to that regulates the original work.
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/
Along these same lines and in line with the Open Access policy, it is clarified that the authors maintain their rights to articles, without restrictions and, in the same way, they maintain their publication rights, without restrictions. They are only asked to reference the number of the Franciscanum magazine where the article initially appeared.
Abstract
This work intends to discuss about the human cognitive acts, specifically knowledge by intuition and by abstraction from the approach of John Duns Scotus, as well as establish the connection to intelligible species and their intentional content. For this, we will focus mainly on the analysis of Quaestio Quodlibetal xiii, in which Scotus develops one of the most innovative problematic knots of his no-ethics, namely: the difference between intuitive and abstractive mental acts, on the one hand, and between intelligible species and mental content, on the other.
For this purpose, this article is organized in three parts, which do not necessarily match to the way John Duns Scotus’ text is exposed, but it is presented as a possible route of the complex issue within the exegetical approach. The interpretative analysis of both the central passages and the theses argued in them, is supported by current studies that exist regarding the Scotist noetics, trying to make the agreement points of agreement as well as the conflict ones evident, with respect to what Scotus understands as cognitive acts, their relation to the object, and what he means when he talks about intelligible species and intentional content.
Downloads
Cited by
