A Structuralist Approach to the Philosophy of Mind
Authors
Perfil Google Scholar
PDF (Español (España))
FLIP
The Revista Guillermo de Ockham provides an immediate and open access to its content, based on the principle of offering the public a free access to investigations to provide a global interchange of knowledge.
Unless otherwise established, the contents of this journal has a license with Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
- Attribution: You must give appropriate credit, provide a link to the license, and indicate if changes were made. You may do so in any reasonable manner, but not in any way that suggests the licensor endorses you or your use.
- NonCommercial: You may not use the material for commercial purposes.
- NoDerivatives: If you remix, transform, or build upon the material, you may not distribute the modified material.
- No additional restrictions: You may not apply legal terms or technological measures that legally restrict others from doing anything the license permits.
Abstract
The purpose of this article is to relate the notion of theory in the philosophy of science, especially from metatheoretical structuralism, with some contemporary aspects of the philosophy of mind, such as the problem of consciousness. We must warn that in this work we do not propose to reconstruct a theory of the mental, not as the supporters of metatheoretical structuralism would like, but we try to combine an epistemological proposal to solve an ontological problem: the nature of mental states, based on a tool whit a high formal component, such as meta-scientific structuralism. Thus, if we discard for a moment the reconstructionist approach of structuralism, it is possible to take the conceptual and formal components to, in the structural language itself, establish theoretical relationships between a proposal of the resource of the philosophy of science with the philosophy of mind. Perhaps this is not a conclusion that a structuralist would widely value, since we do not reconstruct any theory, but we consider that this model-theoretical current has other associated virtues that could be useful to adequately understand a theory; one of these would be, then, conceptual analysis to the extent that some elements of the philosophy of mind, in this case, can be subsumed in structural language.
Keywords:
References
Chalmers, D. (1999). La mente consciente: en busca de una teoría fundamental. Gedisa.
Churchland, P. (1999). Materia y conciencia: introducción contemporánea a la filosofía de la mente. Gedisa.
Dennett, D. (1991). La conciencia explicada. Paidós.
Diéguez, A. (2020). Filosofía de la ciencia: ciencia, racionalidad y realidad. UMA.
Díez, J. A., y Moulines, C. U. (2008). Fundamentos de filosofía de la ciencia. Ariel.
Giere, R. N. (1992). La explicación de la ciencia: un acercamiento cognitivo. Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología.
Jaramillo, J. M. (1993). La reconstrucción teórico-conjuntista de las teorías empíricas: una posible alternativa a la axiomatización formal. Ideas y Valores, (92-93), 47-58. https://revistas.unal.edu.co/index.php/idval/article/view/29198/29540
Jaramillo, J. M. (2021). El ABC del estructuralismo metateórico. Universidad del Atlántico.
Kuhn, T. (1998). La estructura de las revoluciones científicas. FCE.
Lorenzano, P. (2008). Lo a priori constitutivo en la ciencia y las leyes (y teorías) científicas. Revista de Filosofía, 33(2), 21-48. https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=2965275
McGinn, C. (1999). The mysterious flame: Conscious minds in a material world. Basic Books.
Moulines, C. U. (1982). Exploraciones metacientíficas. Alianza.
Moulines, C. U. (2002). La concepción estructuralista de la ciencia. Discusiones Filosóficas, 3(5-6), 11-21. https://revistasojs.ucaldas.edu.co/index.php/discusionesfilosoficas/article/view/6607/6028
Moulines, C. U. (2011). Cuatro tipos de desarrollo teórico en las ciencias empíricas. Metatheoria: Revista de Filosofía e Historia de la Ciencia, 1(2), 11-27. https://doi.org/10.48160/18532330me1.46
Moulines, C. U. (2012). Ontoepistemosemántica en perspectiva estructuralista. En L. M. Peris-Viñé (Ed.), Filosofía de la ciencia en Iberoamérica: metateoría estructural (pp. 19-39). Tecnos.
Searle, J. (2000). El misterio de la conciencia. Paidós.
Searle, J. (2004). Mind: A brief introduction. Oxford University Press.
Sneed, J. (1971). The logical structure of mathematical physics. Reidel Dordrecht.
Stegmüler, W. (1983). Estructura y dinámica de teorías. Ariel.
Thagard, P. (2005). Mind: Introduction to cognitive science. MIT Press.
Truesdell, C. (1984). An idiot´s fugitive essays on science. Springer-Verlag.
Van Fraassen, B. (1980). The scientific image. Oxford University Press.
Wittgenstein, L. (1988). Tractatus lógico-philosophicus. Routledge.
Downloads
Cited by
