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Cárdenas Castañeda, L. (2021). The reliabilist naturalism against Cartesian skepticism and the notion of justification. Revista Guillermo De Ockham, 18(2), 151–160. https://doi.org/10.21500/22563202.4658 (Original work published September 18, 2020)
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Abstract

In this work, we explain why naturalized epistemology occupies such an important place in contemporary philosophy and why it distances itself so radically from traditional epistemology. For this we resort to one of the classic themes of epistemology, the problem of skepticism, to illustrate that according to naturalists, the heirs of Descartes have no conclusive reasons to keep the notion of justification in the definition of knowledge; that is, for defenders of naturalized epistemology, undefined justification is not a substantial condition for obtaining knowledge. In fact, based on the objections to the tripartite definition of knowledge, and specifically to the notion of justification, reliabilist philosophers such as Goldman and Dretske concluded that justification is irrelevant to knowledge, so they introduce the reliabilist definition: belief + truth = reliable knowledge.

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